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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Where Will the Growth Capital Come From?" This is the title
of an article in a relatively recent issue of Business Week.' The
question is typical of the questions currently being discussed in
financial circles.
The Business Week article draws the following conclusions:
There still is vigorous disagreement among economists about the
magnitude involved. But at least two conclusions are emerging
from their work on capital needs and capital formation:
The gap between investment needs and funds available will
not be anywhere near as big as alarmed Wall Streeters have been
estimating it. But it will be a real gap, and the nation will be hard
pressed to find the funds to cover capital requirements increased
by the energy crisis and anti-pollution requirements.
The falling rate of return on the nation's invested capital is
perhaps a greater threat to future capital spending than the shortage of funds. The trend in return has been down since the mid
1960's. If it continues, companies will be reluctant to undertake
2
a good deal of needed investment.
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That public financing has come to a virtual standstill, except
for highly selective financings of major companies, is a generally
acknowledged fact.' Less apparent is the draught occurring in the
private capital markets.
A recent article in the Wall Street Journa 4 points out that
venture capital is getting scarce, and that venture capital firms who
historically invested in new ventures have become wary of uncertain returns and new risks. The article states that venture capital
firms have traditionally made investments in promising small companies with the expectation that they would mature into viable
concerns which would eventually go public and yield many times
the initial capital investment, and then the venture capital firms
would have more capital for new investments. The article points
out that venture capitalists are becoming leary of new ventures,
and entrepreneurs seeking to start companies and recently formed
small companies in dire need of capital are "being shut out."
Significantly, the article indicates that many observers are worried about the future of technological innovation in this country.
Many companies well known today were started with venture
capital money, companies like Digital Equipment Corp., Polaroid Corp., and Memorex Corp. . . . "The great strength of this
country has been the entrepreneurial instinct," says Albert J.
Kelly, Dean for the Boston College School of Management ...
More than patriotic spirit is at stake .... "If we don't have
the Polaroids or Xeroxes in the next five years or so, it's going
to have a tremendous impact in our technology and jobs. .. ."
The article expresses concern that small companies formed
prior to the slumping capital markets are in painful cash squeezes.
One such firm is Novatek Inc., a Burlington, Mass. concern
that has designed a monitoring system for keeping track of buses,
trucks and police cars in transit to improve schedules and efficiency. It's a company "that would have been attractive in the
capital markets a few years ago" says Mr. Healer, who is one
of about thirty-five venture capitalists that have rejected Novatek's request for help within the past year.
As a consequence, "we're spinning our wheels" says Dick
3. See, e.g., Shepard, The Underwriter'sBlues, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 70.
4. Gumpert, Playing it Safe - Venture CapitalFinns, Fearinga Cash Bind, Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 4, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
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Furth, an executive vice-president of Novatek. The five year old
firm has been surviving mostly by sporadic infusions of cash
from friends and relatives and by taking consulting work and
contracts and engineering development apart from its main product, he says. Last year the company had revenues of $125,000 but
lost $100,000 because of the development costs associated with
the vehicle monitoring system.
Now Novatek is negotiating with two larger firms interested
in acquiring it. That's "the only possible alternative" for the
company right now, Mr. Furth says.
It is the view of the author that the Wall Street Journal article
accurately summarizes the present climate for raising private venture capital, while the Business Week article raises the broader
question of raising capital generally.
While economists are grappling with the problems of shrinking
capital and the projected impact on our future economy, lawyers
practicing in the area of private financing should perhaps consider
whether the regulatory process affecting the issuance of securities
in private financing has not itself become a deterrent to the raising
of capital.
The purpose of this article is to review the principal legal vehicles through which private capital is raised with a view toward
critically appraising those legal vehicles and asking, as the economists ponder how to relieve the capital raising crisis, whether such
legal vehicles, as presently constituted, are a deterrent to capital
growth.
In order to fully understand the framework in which these legal
vehicles operate, it should be noted that the issuance of securities
by issuing entities, whether corporations or partnerships, is regulated on both the federal and state levels. The Securities Act of
19335 (hereinafter "Act") is the principal federal act governing the
issuance of securities. However, each state has its own "Blue Sky"
law applicable to the issuance of securities in that state. The framework of these laws, both on the federal and state level, is such that
unless the securities proposed to be issued are issued under provisions either exempting the securities or exempting the transactions
in which they are issued, the securities must be "registered. ' 6 In
5. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77.

6. Loss of the exemption is of concern to the issuer because of its potential liability.
Section 12 of the Act provides that an issuer who violates the Act in the offer or sale of a
security is liable to the investor for rescission (or damages if the securities have been sold

by the investor).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

the registration process, disclosure materials are prepared and reviewed by appropriate regulatory agencies, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC") on the federal
level and Blue Sky Commissions on the state level. It is pursuant
to this process that a "prospectus" is prepared disclosing the principal aspects of the particular business or enterprise involved. Only
through this prospectus may offers and sales be made. Because this
registration process is time consuming, expensive and has certain
special requirements (such as certified financial statements, etc.),
financings frequently are planned to avoid the registration process
if they can be constructed within the framework of the exemption
available for "private" financing. Private financings are frequently
less expensive, less time consuming, more confidential and in other
respects easier to accomplish.
When the underwriting markets cannot absorb public financing, registration, while nonetheless available, is not viable simply
because of the lack of demand by public investors. The lack of
public capital markets and the tightening of the private capital
markets is causing economists and others interested in the capital
markets of this country to focus more critically on capital raising
mechanisms.
It is ironic that while our capital markets, including private
capital markets, are tightening, regulatory activity covering exemptions for private financing has reached an all time high and has
recently culminated in the promulgation by the SEC of three new
rules creating so-called "safe harbors" from the burdens of registration: rule 1467 dealing with the private offering exemption; rule
1478 dealing with the intrastate exemption; and rule 240 dealing
with a new small business financing exemption for closely held
issuers. This article will examine the principal legal vehicles used
For a discussion of civil liability as applied to intrastate transactions see McCauley,
IntrastateSecurities Transactions Under the FederalSecurities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
937, 955-59 (1959) and Gardiner, Intrastate Offering Exemption: Rule 147 - Progress or
Stalemate, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 340, 345-349 (1974).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 2710 (hereinafter cited as rule
146).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974), CCH. FED. SEc. L. REP. 2253 (hereinafter cited as rule
147). Rule 147 was initially proposed in January 1973 in SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5349 (Jan.
8, 1973)(hereinafter cited as Re]. No. 5349) and adopted in SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5450
(hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 5450).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1975), CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 2358 D (hereinafter cited as
rule 240). Interestingly enough, rule 240 was promulgated "to relieve" small business issues
from the burdens of new rule 146.
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by small, middle-sized and large business to raise private capital
under these rules.' 0
If an issuer can confine its financing to one state, it may draw
upon the intrastate exemption provided in section 3(a) (11)" of the
Act or the safe harbor provided in recently promulgated rule 147.
To qualify, the financing would have to be accomplished within the
criteria for such exemption. If the financing involves an interstate
character, is not intended to raise more than $100,000 in a twelve
month period, and the issuer both before and after the offering
does not have more than one hundred beneficial owners, the financing might be accomplished pursuant to recently promulgated rule
240. This rule was intended to apply to small business financing,
to relieve it from the compliance requirements of rule 146. If the
interstate financing is in excess of $100,000 or rule 240 does not
otherwise apply, the issuer will have to rely upon the private offering exemption provided in section 4(2)2 of the Act or the safe
harbor provided in recently promulgated rule 146. A federal exemption that will be only summarily considered in this article is
Regulation A 3 which permits certain financings, not exceeding
$500,000 in a twelve month period, to be accomplished in a modified registration process requiring the filing of a Notification (the
counterpart of an S-1 registration statement) and the use of an
Offering Circular (the counterpart of the prospectus). While the
burdens of the "registration process" for Regulation A filings are
not as great as for filings under the Act, and while it occupies a
useful place in the spectrum of legal vehicles available for small
10. This article will not deal with the more specially exempted securities of the Securi-

ties Act of 1933 such as government issued securities, money market instruments (commercial paper), securities issued by not-for-profit issuers, securities issued by building and loan

associations, savings and loan associations and similar institutions, securities issed by common or contract carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, certificates issued by a
receiver or trustee in bankruptcy approved by the court, insurance or endowment policies

or annuity contracts or optional annuity contracts issued by corporations subject to supervision of the insurance commissioners of the states, securities exchanged by the issuer with
its existing security holders, and securities issued in exchanges where the exchange is
approved after hearing, by any court or agency of the United States or of any state. 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a). While there are other exemptions covering securities issued in certain

transactions, the vehicles referred to above are the principal vehicles for raising capital in
the private capital markets.

It. Section 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

2251.

12. Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2707.
13. Sec. Reg. A., General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, rules
251-263, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263 (1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2360 (hereinafter cited
as Reg. A.).
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business non-registered financing, it is really a hybrid between the
type of exemptions, referred to above, and the full registration
process that typifies the various registration statements and the
processing thereof under the Act. Finally, because all private financings must also comply with the requirements of the Blue Sky
laws of the states in which the securities are to be sold, the question
of Blue Sky coordination with the federal exemptions will be reviewed against the background of the exemptions for nonregistered
financings allowed in the states of Illinois and Wisconsin.
II.

THE INTRASTATE EXEMPTION AND RULE

147

A. Introduction
The first question an issuer should determine in seeking to raise
private capital is whether the financing can be accomplished on an
"intrastate" basis. As will be pointed out, private financing under
rule 146 or residual section 4(2) of the Act (the private offering
exemption) involves specific disclosure requirements that can be
very burdensome for small and middle-sized businesses and those
14
businesses without a history of drafting registration statements.
There are also other aspects of complying with those exemptions
that warrant taking a new look at the intrastate exemption as interpreted by rule 147 to determine whether it can occupy a useful
role in the modem spectrum of private financing. This is not to
suggest that the intrastate exemption is any special panacea. It has
limited application. However, if it does apply to the circumstances
of a particular issuer, compliance with that exemption may be less
burdensome than compliance with rule 146 or residual section 4(2).
In any event, this is a threshold analysis an issuer should make in
planning its private financing.
The intrastate exemption lost favor with issuing entities in the
1950's and 1960's primarily because of the difficulties of avoiding
interstate offers and sales. In addition, as a means of public or
semi-public financing, underwriters did not view it with the same
level of acceptance as interstate public financings.
However, now that the "heyday" of the public financings of the
1960's can be viewed in better perspective, another look should be
taken at the intrastate exemption in the area of private financing.
As will be apparent from an exposition of the intrastate exemption
14. See the discussion, infra, regarding the disclosure requirements of rule 146 and
Section 4(2).
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in this article, there are no disclosure requirements, such as the
preparation and delivery of a prospectus, offering circular or other
disclosure document necessary to invoke the intrastate exemption.
This does not mean that it is advisable not to use any disclosure
material. Disclosure is still desirable to insulate the issuer against
future challenges of fraud. However, the many problems of
complying with the extensive disclosure requirements of rule 146
and the risks involved in noncompliance warrant consideration,
from a legal planning point of view, of the intrastate exemption,
especially the safe harbor of rule 147. Such consideration alleviates
the concern that failure to cover some nuance of disclosure will be
a technical grounds for losing the exemption.
While the SEC has never taken an official position discouraging the intrastate exemption, it has been the view of securities law
practitioners that the SEC does not favor the intrastate exemption.
This view seems even more apparent in rule 147. There is one
aspect of the intrastate exemption that could be the basis for the
SEC's concern as to its use, at least in public financing. Apart from
all of the other ramifications of the intrastate exemption, one principal aspect involves trading in securities that have been issued
after the offering has come to rest. The structure of the securities
markets today is essentially interstate in character. There is very
little purely intrastate securities trading transactions by intrastate
dealers. The SEC's concern may be that widely issued securities
in an intrastate offering could get into the channels of the interstate
securities markets without the registrational controls designed to
regulate securities issued publicly in such markets. This may be a
valid concern as to public financing. It does not seem valid for
private financing. This may be one of the defects of the intrastate
exemption as no distinction has been attempted historically or in
rule 147 between widespread public financing and private financing. In attempting to cover all possible financings, the exemption
must necessarily become unduly restrictive of private financings.
It should be further noted that the SEC is not appreciative of
the state Blue Sky registration process substituting for its registration process, because of the disparity among the state Blue Sky
laws and the administration thereof throughout the country. Some
states have Blue Sky laws tantamount to the Act and have staffs
and administrative expertise to process registration statements on
a sophisticated basis. Other states either do not have such laws or
do not have the staff and administrative expertise with which to
process such registration statements with sophistication.
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While this author is sympathetic to the use of the intrastate
exemption, if applicable, in private financing, the problem in its use
in public financing is twofold:
(1) A public "after market" in which active trading can occur
has been very limited for most so-called public intrastate offerings,
yet investors anticipated that they were acquiring securities for
which there would be a "liquid" after market;
(2) There is the opportunity for introducing into the interstate
securities markets securities that have effectively avoided the interstate securities registrational process.
For the above reasons public intrastate financing is not likely
to become popular under the intrastate exemption as presently
constituted, and the intrastate exemption is likely to be confined
(because of its restrictive nature) to private offerings or at least
offerings more limited than many of the widespread offerings
under the intrastate exemption in the past.
B. The Intrastate Exemption Prior to Rule 147
I. The Statutory Exemption
The intrastate exemption is provided in section 3(a) (11) of the
Act, which exempts from the registration requirements of the Act:
Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to
persons resident within the single state or territory, where the
issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business
within, or if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such state or territory.
There are essentially three elements of this exemption:
(1) A "single" issue,
(2) Issuer and purchasers have same "residence," and
(3) Issuer must be doing business within the state of issuance.
The simplicity of the statutory language has given rise to various judicial and administrative interpretations involving these
three elements. Before reviewing these specific interpretative problems, some general observations about the exemption are appropriate.
First of all, it should be noted that if the exemption is complied
with, it is not rendered otherwise unavailable because of the use of
the mails or other facilities of interstate commerce. 15 One might
15. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 1459 (May 29, 1937), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 2260-2262;
see also SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 2270-2277
(hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 4434).
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assume that an intrastate exemption precludes the use of any in-

strumentality of interstate commerce. This is not the case. The
mails, telephone and other interstate facilities may be used, pro-

vided there is compliance with the exemption.
Furthermore, general advertising is permitted, provided that
the advertising on its face makes it clear that an offer is being
solicited from and a sale may be made only to residents of the
particular state involved.16

One of the principal problems under section 3(a)(1 1) is that an
offer to even one nonresident could destroy the exemption for the

entire issue. 17 Counsel have been uncomfortable in issuing opinions
on intrastate offerings because of the risk inherent in one offer or
one sale being made to a nonresident and the difficulty in controlling such transactions, especially as intrastate offerings tend to be
offered by less sophisticated companies and underwriters.
Although section 3(a)(1 1) purports to exempt the "securities"
issued in the transaction set forth in the exemption, the exemption

is really a transactional exemption."8 It is the transactional nature
of the exemption that requires additional concern with regard to

the further transfer and distribution of such securities. Such securities are not per se exempt securities.
2.

Interpretative Problems of Principal Elements of Statutory

Exemption

Part of an issue. A major interpretative problem involving the
16. Rel. No. 4434 at 4.
17. The exemption is not available unless the entire issue of securities is offered and sold
exclusively to residents of the state in question and if any part of the issue is offered or sold
to a nonresident, the exemption is unavailable not only for the securities sold, but for all
securities of the issue, including those sold to residents. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4386 (July
12, 1961), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 76,774; Rel. No. 4434 at 1; Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229
F. Supp. 75 (D. Mont. 1964). See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186
F. Supp. 830, 870-72 (S.D. Cal.), affd 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
919 (1961); Ned J. Bowman, 39 S.E.C. 879 (1960); SEC v. Hillsborough Inc., 173 F. Supp.
86, 87-88 (D. N.H. 1958), affd 276 F.2d 665 (Ist Cir. 1960); Shaw v. United States, 131
F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630, 634-35
(1958); Universal Serv. Corp., 37 S.E.C. 173, 175 (1956); Peterson Engine Co., 2 S.E.C.
893, 903 (1937); Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935). See Sosin, The
IntrastateExemption: Public Offerings and the Issue Concept, 16 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
110, 111 (1964); Sosin, The IntrastateExemption, Securities Law Practice (Ill. Inst. for
CLE, 1973) Chap. 4 4.3.
18. In 1934 the exemption was transferred from section 5(c) and incorporated into
Section 3(a). 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended; 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1970). See also Rel. No.
4434.
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question of "the issue" is whether separate offerings could be integrated and deemed to be part of a single issue so as to render
unavailable the intrastate exemption for either or both of the two
separate offerings. Curiously enough, a later registered offering (or

a Regulation A offering) of an interstate character could be integrated with an earlier intrastate offering and, because of the interstate character of the registered offering (or Regulation A offering), make the intrastate exemption unavailable for the first offer-

ing.

19

In this regard, it should be noted that the amount of proceeds
to be raised under Regulation A ($500,000 maximum) may be
affected by any intrastate sales that, under the integration rules,
are integrated with a Regulation A offering. Regulation A re-

quires, in computing the ceiling for Regulation A offerings, the
inclusion of the value of all securities sold in violation of the registration provisions (section 5) of the Act within one year prior to
the commencement of the Regulation A offering. If a sizable intrastate offering preceded, within a year, a Regulation A offering,
and the two offerings were deemed integrated, the amount of secur-

ities that could be sold in the Regulation A offering could be
substantially reduced. 0
In the SEC's principal interpretative release21 of the intrastate
exemption, it outlined certain factors that will determine whether
a single issue is involved.
The SEC stated that any one or more22 of the following factors
may be determinative of whether apparently separate offerings

should be integrated:
19. See Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938); Rel. No. 4434 at 2, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 1 2272 at 2608. See also Edsco Mfg. Co. Inc., 40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1961);
Peoples Securities Co., 39 S.E.C. 641, 651 (1960), affdsub. nom., Peoples Securities Co.
v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961); Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir.
1942); Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630, 634 (1958); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die
Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969), see also I L. Loss, SEcURrrlas REGULATION 593 (2d
ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as Loss); Re. No. 5450. Integration problems should also be
considered in connection with section 3(a)(9) (exemption involving exchange of securities
by an issuer) Sec. Act Rel. No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2140 and
section 4(2) (the private offering exemption) Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 2775-2783.
20. Reg. A, Rule 254(a)(1). Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933 Highways and Byways, 8 N.Y.L. F. 3, 33-36 (1962).
21. Rel. No. 4434.
22. A Commission release subsequent to No. 4434 enunciated the five requirements in
the private offering exemption and omitted the stipulation of "any one or more." SEC Sec.
Act Rel. No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 2770 at 2918.
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Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;
Do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of secuAre the offerings made at or about the same time;
Is the same type of consideration to be received; and
Are the offerings made for the same general purpose?

Since the promulgation of that release, separate offerings have
had to stand the test of these criteria from a planning point of view,
or the consequences of integration warranted alternative plans of
financing.2
It is the uncertainty of the integration rules that made planning
difficult prior to rule 147 wherever interstate offerings were reasonably related in time and purpose to an intrastate offering. This will
continue to be a hazard for planning intrastate offerings either
outside of rule 147 or within that rule but not within its provisions
creating a safe harbor 24 from the integration rules. The safe harbor
from integration provided in rule 147 should lend itself, where
applicable to the facts, to a more comfortable reliance on the
intrastate exemption than was the case in the past or will be for
anyone attempting to rely on residual section 3(a)(1 1).
In this regard, this writer does not encourage the use of the
section 3(a)(1 1) exemption outside of rule 147. As will probably be
the case under rule 146 as well, the uncertainty of the intrastate
exemption law prior to rule 147 is likely to cause judges to "find"
that law in the elements of rule 147 and impose, at a minimum,
the criteria of that rule in any event. Accordingly, to plan an
intrastate offering beyond the criteria of rule 147 seems hazardous.
Residence within the state: residency of purchasers. SEC release number 44345 points out that the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption
requires that the entire issue be confined to the single state in which
the issuer, offerees and purchasers are residents. Mere presence in
the state is not sufficient. Moreover, merely obtaining formal representations as to residency and agreements not to sell to nonresidents or agreements that sales are void if the purchaser is a nonres23. For an excellent discussion of the integration problems see Sosin note 17, supra, at
4.3-3.11 and Kant, SEC Rule 147- A FurtherNarrowing of the IntrastateExemption, 30
Bus. LAW. 73, 82 (1974). See also Sosin, The IntrastateExemption: Public Offerings and
the Issue Concept, 16 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 110, 111 (1964). An analysis of the integration
concept can be found in Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 91,523 at 94971 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
24. Rule 147(b)(2) discussed infra.
25. Rel. No. 4434 at 1.
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ident should not be relied upon without more to establish the availability of the exemption.
Prior to rule 147 residency had been equated with domicile by
2
the SECY.
Accordingly, it was the domicile of the individual that
counted. For this reason the SEC has indicated that military personnel are not residents of a state just because they are stationed
in that state.27 Conversely, residents may be temporarily outside of
the state of residence, and an offer and sale to them in their temporary location is not an offer and sale to a nonresident.28 Finally, if
the offering has come to rest, and the resident purchaser moves out
side of the state, the exemption is not lost.29
In order for the issuer to discharge its burden of assuring that
the offers and sales are to residents, counsel frequently required
representations and proof of domicile such as a driver's license,
voter registration or other evidence of domiciliary residency.
Residence within the state: residence of issuer. Section-3(a)(l 1)
by its own terms specifies that a corporate issuer is a resident of
its state of incorporation. The view of the SEC under section
3(a)(1 1) that the general partners of a limited partnership must all
be residents of the state of organization of the partnership 0 has
been rejected by rule 147 which now equates partnerships as an
issuing entity with corporations. 3' There was no meaningful basis
in the past for this distinction between issuing entities.
Residence within the state: coming to rest. A major interpretative problem has involved the question, not apparent in the lan26. See SEC Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. Part 1, 571 (1963). See also Loss, note 19 supra, at 598-599. In Rel. No.
5349 the SEC stated that the proposed rule "does abandon the domicile test and attempts
to provide more objective standards for determining when a person is considered a resident." The actual wording of the proposed rule, however, would have required an analysis
similar to that involved in determining a person's domicile under the prior administrative
test. In Rel. No. 5450, adopting the rule, the SEC stated that it deleted the intent requirement because of the difficulty in determining a person's intentions.
27. SEC v. Big Top, Inc., Litigation Release 2756 (D. Nev. 1963); SEC v. Capital
Funds, Inc., Litigation Release 1805 (D. Alaska, 1960).
28. See SEC v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, Colo., CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP.
90,861 (D. Colo. 1958); see also SEC v. North American Finance Co., 214 F. Supp.
197, 201-202 (D. Ariz. 1959); United States v. Karmel, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 275 (D. Nev.

1964).
29. See McCauley, supra note 6, at 946.
30. American Plan Investment Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,044 (1971); Boetel
& Co. (SEC Staff Letter, Dec. 18, 1972).
31. Rule 147(c)(l)(ii). As originally proposed rule 147 would have provided that a
partnership is a resident of a state only if all of its general partners were residents of that
state. Rel. No. 5349 at 10.
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guage of the exemption, of when the issue has "come to rest" so
that subsequent sales to nonresidents may be made.
On the question of coming to rest, release number 44342 ex-

panded on earlier judicial concepts to point out that securities must
come to rest in the hands of resident investors who have purchased
without a view toward further distribution or resale to nonresidents. The SEC points out that if the distribution was not completed prior to the time all of the securities being offered were
acquired by a nonresident, the exemption was not available to the
issuer or to any person participating in the distribution. 3 This
was frequently a problem in a public intrastate offering, because
the securities were offered either by the company or by underwriters on a best efforts basis, and the offering might be continued
over the space of several months. Thus there were practical problems of controlling redistributions by the first purchasers before
the offering had finally been completed several months later.
This gave rise to the preventative practice of requiring investors
to make certain representations regarding their intentions to purchase without a view toward resale to nonresidents prior to the
offering being completed. Appropriate legends were placed on the
certificates evidencing the restrictions. In order to avoid resales
during the period of the offering, arbitrary periods of time were
frequently imposed restricting transfers to nonresidents. The SEC
indicated (prior to rule 147) that it would presume resales by residents within one year from the initial intrastate offering to be part
of the initial offering and thus subject to the residency test.3 4 This
has given rise to the so-called "one year rule" restricting transfers
to nonresidents for that period of time. 5 That concept always
seemed arbitrary to this author and unsupported by the statute or
case law.
Along with the integration problem, the rule barring resales to
nonresidents within a year of the initial offering was (and is under
residual section 3(a)(l 1)), one of the major obstacles to the use of
32. Rel. No. 4434 at 3.
33. Id. at 3.
34. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., I S.E.C. 147 (1935); but see Subaru of
America, Inc., [Dec. 19, 1972] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,233 which indicates that the
SEC is likely to extend that time period if the shares being transferred can be viewed as an
unsold allotment of the original intrastate offering.
35. See Goldman, The Intrastate Offering, PLI New Trends and Special Problems
under the Securites Law at 190 (1973) (A. A. Sommer, Jr., ed., 1970); Schneider, The
IntrastateOffering Exemption, Second Annual Institute on Securities Regulation at 22, 29
(R. Mundheim & A. Flecher, eds. 1971).
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the intrastate exemption. To jeopardize the validity of an offering
(where the securities sold were all sold to residents within the state
who acquired such securities without the view to sales outside the
state) by a single resale outside the state prior to the expiration of
a year renders, for all practical purposes, the exemption useless.
Unfortunately, rule 147 has only reduced that period of jeopardy
to nine months (from the date of the last sale).3 6 As in the case of
the integration rules, the so-called "one year rule" makes reliance
on residual 3(a)(1 1) hazardous.
As indicated above, the SEC should consider different resale
rules for private financing as opposed to public financing. It is the
broad resale of securities issued in public intrastate offerings that
creates the principal concern about their resale in the interstate
trading markets. Resales growing out of private intrastate financings pose very little threat to the regulation of the interstate trading
markets. Yet the issuers in those private financings are subject to
the one year resale rule under residual section 3(a)(1 1) and the nine
month rule under rule 147. The jeopardy to the exemption of the
private issuer seems disproportionate to the threat posed to the
interstate trading markets by such securities. Hopefully, the SEC
will focus on this possible distinction in the future.
Doing business. The SEC pointed out in release number 4434
that the legislative history of the Act clearly shows that the section
3(a)(1 1) exemption was designed to apply only to local financing
that may practicably be consummated entirely within the state or
territory in which the issuer is both incorporated and doing businessY In view of this characterization of the exemption as designed to apply only to local financing, the SEC in the same release
expressed the view that the requirement of the statute that the
issuer be doing business in the state can only be satisfied by the
performance of substantial operational activities in the state of
incorporation.3 8 The SEC pointed out that the doing business requirement was not met by functions in the particular state such as
bookkeeping, stock recording and similar activities or by offering
securities in the state. The SEC's examples of when the exemption
would be unavailable include: an offering by a company made in
the state of its incorporation of undivided fractional oil and gas
interests located in other states, even though the company con36. Rule 147(e).
37. Rel. No. 4434 at 1.
38. Id. at 2.
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ducted other business in the state of its incorporation; an offering
by a local mortgage company offering interests in out-of-state
mortgages which are sold under circumstances that constitute them
investment contracts; an offering, by a real estate syndicate organized in one state to the residents of that state, of property acquired
under a sale and leaseback arrangement with another corporation
organized and engaged in business in another state.
The SEC further pointed out that if the proceeds of the offering
are to be used primarily for the purpose of a new business conducted outside of the state of incorporation and unrelated to some
incidental business locally conducted, the exemption could not be
relied upon. The release also made it clear that the exemption
could not be relied upon for each of a series of corporations organized in different states where there is, infact and purpose, a single
business enterprise or financial venture whether or not it is planned
to merge or consolidate the various corporations at a later date."
The only really definitive case on the subject of doing business
0 case which required
is the Chapman"
a "predominant amount of
business" in the state but'did not spell out what "predominant"
meant.
This points out one of the major problems in planning an intrastate offering in the past, i.e., the lack of definitive, quantitative
guidelines on "doing business." While one writer views the cases
which have been decided on this point as requiring that the issuer
expend more than 50% of the offering proceeds locally and conduct
at least the same amount of intrastate business,4 1 no reliable quantity standards had been developed prior to the SEC's 80% tests on
doing business and use of proceeds formulated in rule 147.
As in the areas of the "single issue" and "residency," great
uncertainty exists as to "doing business," and unless the business
is almost entirely located and operated within a given state (and
the proceeds also employed there), relying on residual section
3(a)(1 1) for percentages less than the 80% figures of rule 147 can.
be hazardous. Does rule 147 offer any relief?
39. Id. at 2-3. See also Commercial Credit Co. [November 5, 1971] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 78,544; SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830,
871 (S.D. Cal. 1960), affd 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
40. Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
41. See Cummings, The IntrastateExemption and the Shallow Harborof Rule 147, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 167, 180 (1974). See also letter from the Committee on Federal Regulations
of Securities of the American Bar Association to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(first draft) Feb. 27, 1973.
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C. Rule 147
Against a background of uncertainty as to the elements of the
intrastate exemption and the difficulty of planning such an exemption to the satisfaction of every party to such a transaction, particularly counsel, the SEC, on January 7, 1974, adopted rule 147.42
In the release adopting the rule, the SEC stated that: the rule is
not exclusive;4 3 the adoption of the rule would provide more certainty in determining when the exemption provided by section
3(a)(1 1) is available; local businesses seeking financing solely from
local sources would have objective standards to facilitate compliance with section 3(a)(1 1); and the rule will enable such businesses
to determine with greater certainty whether they may use the exemption in offering their securities. As a caveat, the SEC stated
that the rule gives more assurance that the intrastate offering exemption will be used only for the purpose intended, i.e., local
financing of companies primarily intrastate in character.
While it is true that rule 147 has objectified many of the interpretative elements of section 3(a)(1 1), there is disagreement as to
whether the rule has restricted the intrastate offering exemption
under existing judicial and administrative interpretations, and
whether, in view of that, the rule will be as useful as intended.
There are some who view the rule's apparent restrictiveness as
reflecting a long-standing SEC attitude against the intrastate exemption. Serious questions can be raised as to whether the intrastate exemption should be available for so-called public financing
or financing of a character where the investors contemplate and
anticipate an after market in which their securities can be traded.
Viewed in this light, rule 147 may indeed be more restrictive than
it is under prior judicial interpretations. However, if rule 147 is
confined to private financing or to the limited issuances of securities wholly within a given state where it is not intended that there
should be an after market for the trading of such securities, it may
42. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

79,617

(hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 5450).
43. Rel. No. 5450. However, persons who choose to rely on section 3(a)(l 1) without
complying with all the conditions of the rule would have the burden of establishing that they

have complied with the judicial and administrative interpretations of section 3(a)(l 1) in
effect at the time of the offering. The Commission also emphasizes that the exemption

provided by section 3(a)(l 1) is not an exemption from the civil liability provisions of section
12(2) or the anti-fraud provisions of section 17 of the Act or of section 10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934. The Commission further emphasizes that rule 147 is available only
for transactions by issuers and is not available for secondary offerings.
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be that the objectifying of the criteria by the rule will cause greater
reliance on it, perhaps subject to some further suggested amendments.
1. Transactions Covered By the Rule
Paragraph (a) of the rule provides that offers and sales of securities that meet all the conditions of the rule will be deemed to come
within the exemption provided by section 3(a)(1 1). Thus, compliance with the rule creates a "safe harbor" previously unknown
under the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption.
2. Part of an Issue
Paragraph (b) of the rule attempts to objectify one of the interpretative problems of the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption i.e., defining
what is "part of an issue." The rule provides that, for purposes of
the rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include offers or sales
of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided by
section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act, or pursuant to any registration
statement filed under the Act, that take place prior to the six
month period immediately preceding, or after the six month period
immediately following any offers or sales pursuant to the rule,
provided that there are during either of said six month periods no
offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or
similar class as those offered or sold pursuant to the rule. A note
to this paragraph makes it clear that, in the event securities of the
same or similar class as those offered pursuant to the rule are
offered or sold less than six months prior to or subsequent to any
offer or sale pursuant to the rule, the criteria for integrating any
such offering shall be the criteria established in release number
4434.44

Thus, the rule attempts to objectify the question of integration
and provides a limited safe harbor from integration. The rule
leaves to the old integration rules the question of whether integration applies in the event the safe harbor cannot be satisfied.
The first part of paragraph (b) makes it clear that, for purposes
of the rule, all securities of the issuer which are part of an issue
for purposes of the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption shall be offered or
sold only in accordance with all the terms and conditions of the
rule. In other words, an issue cannot be split into different parts,
44. Rel. No. 4434 at 2.
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one part of which is offered under the rule and other parts of which
are offered otherwise.
While the rule has created a limited safe harbor for integration,
it has not foreclosed avoiding integration in other situations where,
under appropriate circumstances, there should be no integration of
separate offerings even though the separate offerings have occurred
within the time period set forth in the safe harbor. There are various circumstances under which securities of the same or similar
class as those offered or sold under the rule may be made to
nonresidents during the periods of the safe harbor; for example,
securities issued in corporate reorganizations (mergers, sale of assets), conversions, exercises of options and warrants, etc.
It should be noted that, because of the difficulty in applying the
integration criteria that apply outside the safe harbor provisions to
concrete fact situations, issuers planning intrastate exemptions
may still have as much trouble interpreting the nonsafe harbor
criteria as they had before the rule was promulgated. One author
questions whether some further objectivity is not necessary in resolving questions of integration outside of the safe harbor and
hopes that interpretative letters under this part of the rule will
provide objective criteria to determine whether offers or sales of
securities to nonresidents outside of the safe harbor provisions of
the rule will be integrated with those pursuant to the rule. He
suggests that the SEC should confirm that intrastate offerings in
reliance on the rule will not be integrated with offers or sales of
the same or similar class of securities pursuant to reclassifications,
mergers or consolidations, existing employee stock options, bonus
or incentive plans or acquisitions of different companies. He further suggests that two separate offerings should not be integrated
if at least two of the five factors referred to above for integration
can be answered in the negative, or if the offerings are separated
by a period of at least six months with perhaps a shorter time
difference between interstate offerings and subsequent registered
offerings. 5
This author believes that if we are going to hope for greater
objectivity of the integration criteria of the rule, it should not be
accomplished by interpretative or no-action letters and positions,
which sometimes are difficult to apply beyond the special facts of
the situation involved. The SEC should, by amendment to the rule,
45. Kant, supra note 23, at 82.
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make it clear that the types of security issuances referred to above
(and any others equally appropriate) do not satisfy the criteria for
integration. Of course, these types of security issuances are probably the best illustrations of situations where integration does not
apply, although counsel's opinion would be benefitted by an
amendment to the rule making that clear.
In any event, it appears that, except for the limited safe harbor,
the question of interpreting when separate offerings are to be integrated remains essentially the same problem of interpretation as
existed before rule 147, and perhaps some further objectifying is
in order to eliminate this concern about utilizing rule 147 for the
intrastate exemption.
3. Nature of the Issuer
Paragraph (c) of the rule provides that, at the time of any offers
and sales, the issuer of securities must be a person, resident in, and
doing business within, the state or territory in which all of the
offers and sales are made. The rule then defines what is meant by
being a resident and doing business.
As to being a resident, the rule provides that the issuer shall
be deemed to be a resident of the state or territory in which: (a) it
is incorporated or organized, if a corporation, limited partnership
or other form of business organization that is organized under state
or territorial law; (b) its principal office is located, if the issuer is
a general partnership or other form of business organization that
is not organized under any state or territorial law; and (c) the
principal residence is located, if the issuer is an individual. It
should be noted that the rule, as originally proposed, would have
required all of the general partners of a partnership to be residents
of the state of the partnership's organization. The release in which
rule 147 was promulgated points out that the SEC had reconsidered that provision in light of the provisions applicable to corporations and determined that all business entities should be treated
in the same manner, Le., emphasizing where the business entity
was incorporated or organized and where its principal office is
located.
The SEC has finally put to rest all of the speculation as to what
constitutes doing business for purposes of the exemption. The rule
as adopted provides that the issuer shall be deemed to be doing
business within the state or territory if:
(1) the issuer derived at least 80% of its gross revenues, includ-
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ing that of its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis," from the operations of a business in, or from real property located in, or from
the rendering of services within such state or territory;

(2) the issuer had at the end of its most recent semi-annual
fiscal period prior to the first offer of any part of the issue, at least
80% of its assets and those of its subsidiaries on a consolidated
basis located within such state or territory;

(3) the issuer intends to use and uses at least 80% of the net
proceeds to the issuer from sales made pursuant to the rule in
connection with the operation of a business or of real property in

the purchase of real property located in, or the rendering of services within such state or territory; and
(4) the principal office of the issuer is located within such state
47
or territory.
46. The rule provides that the gross revenue is computed as of the issuer's most recent
fiscal year, if the first offer of any part of the issue is made during the first six months of
the issuer's current fiscal year or for the first six months of its current fiscal year or during
the twelve month fiscal period ending with such six month period, if the first offer of any
part of the issue is made during the last six months of the issuer's current fiscal year. The
issuer will not be deemed to be doing business if he has not had gross revenues in excess of
$5,000 from the conduct of his business for its most recent twelve month fiscal period.
47. Rule 147(c)(2). The following examples demonstrate the manner in which these
standards would be interpreted:
Example 1. X corporation is incorporated in State A and has its only warehouse, only manufacturing plant and only office in that state. X's only business is
selling products throughout the United States and Canada through mail order catalogs. X annually mails catalogs and order forms from its office to residents of most
states and several provinces of Canada. All orders are filled at and products shipped
from X's warehouse to customers throughout the United States and Canada. All the
products shipped are manufactured by X at its plant in State A. These activities are
X's sole source of revenues.
Question. Is X deriving more than 80 percent of its gross revenues from the
"operation of a business or. . . rendering of services" within State A?
InterpretativeResponse. Yes, this aspect of the "doing business within" standard is satisfied.
Example 2. Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that X has no
manufacturing plant and purchases the products it sells from corporations located
in other states.
Question. Is X deriving more than 80 percent of its gross revenues from the
"operation of a business or. . . rendering of services" within State A?
Interpretative Response. Yes, this aspect of the "doing business within" standard is satisfied.
Example 3. Y Corporation is incorporated in State B and has its only office in
that state. Y's only business is selling undeveloped land located in State C and State
D by means of brochures mailed from its office throughout the United States.
Question. Is Y deriving more than 80 percent of its gross revenues from the
"operation of a business or of property or rendering of services" within State B?
Interpretative.Response. There are not sufficient facts to respond. If Y owns
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One author" has commented that the doing business standard
has escalated from the simple requirement of the statute, to the

performance of "substantial operational" activities formulated in
the release number 443449 on the subject, to the "predominant
amount of business" requirement enunciated by the Chapman'"
case, to the "principal" business requirement of the staff, to "sub-

stantially all" standards of the rule. He criticizes this escalation as
representing a clear departure from the language and intent of the

statute as well as from prior judicial and administrative interpretations. The author's concern is well founded, and his reference to
the escalation is a view that was held by many securities practition-

ers prior to the adoption of rule 147. It should be noted that this
escalation was pointed out to the SEC in comments made in re-

sponse to the proposed rule which stressed that the evolution of the
"doing business within" language of the statute did not support

unduly restrictive standards. For example, tests of 50% were urged
if the SEC wanted to objectify the doing business standard. The

SEC's adoption of the rule in its present form can only reflect the
SEC's general attitude of discouraging the use of the intrastate
exemption. The above author laments, and properly so, that the
an interest in the developed land, it might not satisfy the "80 percent of assets"
standard as well as the "80 percent of gross revenues" standard. Moreover, Y could
not use more than 20 percent of the-proceeds of any offerings made pursuant to the
rule in connection with the acquisition of the undeveloped land.
Example 4. Z company is a firm of engineering consultants organized under the
laws of State E with its only office in that state. During any year, Z will provide
consulting services for projects in other states. 75 percent of Z's work in terms of
man-hours will be performed at Z's offices where it employs some 50 professional
and clerical personnel. Z has no employees located outside of State E. However,
professional personnel visit project sites and clients' offices in other states. Approximately 50 percent of Z's revenue is derived from clients located in states other than
State E.
Question. Is Z deriving more than 80 percent of its gross revenues from "rendering services" within State E?
Interpretative Response. Yes, this aspect of the "doing business within" standard is satisfied.
Example 5. The facts are the same as in Example 4. In addition, at the end of
Z's most recent fiscal quarter 25 percent of its assets are represented by accounts
receivable from clients in other states.
Question. Does Z satisfy the "assets" standard?
Interpretative Response. Yes, Z satisfies the "assets" standard. For purposes
of the rule, accounts receivable arising from a business conducted in the state would
generally be considered to be located at the principal office of the issuer.
48. See Kant, supra, note 23 at 84 n.50.
49. Rel. No. 4434 at 2.
50. Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969).
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price of objective standards was quite dear.
It might also be pointed out that the use of the proceeds test
as a general criterion for the use of the exemption may be a distorted application of what has been relied upon in special cases.
The appropriateness of the use of the proceeds test may be seriously questioned as an essential element of the exemption, because
its application in the past had relevance only in those situations
involving either a company in the developmental stage or one
which was otherwise raising an amount of new capital which was
disproportionately large in relation to existing capitalization.5' The
relevance of the use of proceeds in those cases was simply to determine the question of whether the business to be conducted was
essentially intrastate in character. There does not seem to be any
substantial reason why an issuer which is primarily a local operation, before and after the offering, should have the availability of
the exemption dependent upon where and how the proceeds of an
offering are used.
Imposing the gross assets, gross revenues and use of proceeds
test at the 80% level is to essentially limit the availability of the
intrastate exemption, even though the relationship of the issuer to
the purchasers might be entirely intrastate and be a relationship
that historically was of a type that should be regulated by the
states.
4.

Residence of Offerees and Purchasers
Paragraph (d) of the rule provides that, for the purpose of
determining the residence of offerees and purchasers, a corporation, partnership, trust or other form of business organization shall
be deemed to be a resident of a state or territory if at the time of
the offer and sale it has its principal office within such state or
territory. The rule further provides that an individual shall be
deemed to be a resident of the state or territory in which such
individual has, at the time of the offer and sale to him, his principal
residence. The domicile theory in prior SEC interpretations seems
to be rejected in this rule. A corporation, partnership, trust or
other form of business organization which is organized for the
specific purpose of acquiring part of an issue offered pursuant to
the rule shall be deemed not to be a resident of a state or territory
unless all of the beneficial owners of such organization are resi51. See SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957); SEC v.
McDonald Inv. Co.; 343 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1972).
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dents of such state or territory.
The rule as adopted has deleted the requirement that an individual must, in addition to having his principal residence in the
state or territory of issue, have no present intention of moving his
principal residence to a different state or territory in order to be
considered a "resident" under the rule. The "no present intention"
standard has apparently been deleted because of the difficulty in
ascertaining and proving the subjective intent of an offeree or purchaser. It should be noted that the requirement with respect to the
principal residence relates only to the time the offer and sale is
made to the particular individual involved. A change of residence
by such offeree or purchaser prior to the completion of the offering
by the issuer will not defeat the exemption.
5. Limitations on Resales
Paragraph (e) of the rule provides that during the period in
which securities which are part of an issue are being offered and
sold by the issuer, and for a period of nine months from the date
of the last sale by the issuer of such securities, all resales of any
part of the issue, by any person, shall be made only to persons
resident in such state or territory. A note to paragraph (e) provides
that, in the case of convertible securities, resales of either the convertible security, or if it is converted, the underlying security, may
be made during the period described in paragraph (e) only to persons resident within such state or territory. For purposes of this
rule, a conversion in reliance on section 3(a)(9) of the Act does not
begin a new period.
The rule further provides that dealers must satisfy the requirements of rule 15(c)2- 11 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prior to publishing any quotation for a security or submitting any
quotation for publication in any quotation medium.
While the rule as adopted shortens, from twelve months (as
originally proposed) 2 to nine months, the period in which sales
cannot be made to nonresidents (dating from the last sale), basically the same problem exists as before the rule, i.e., the issuer
cannot be assured of the exemption until nine months after the
completion of the offering pursuant to which the securities are sold.
If the offering was completed in six months, there would be a
period of fifteen months before the issuer knew with any reasona52. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

79,168.
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ble certainty that the transaction was properly exempt. Moreover,
it leaves the exemption dependent on events not subject to the
issuer's control, in that a security holder may resell the security to
a nonresident without the transaction appearing on the records of
the issuer regardless of the issuer's policing efforts.
Prior to the adoption of rule 147 there were many comments
submitted to the SEC suggesting that paragraph (e) of the rule
should be deleted, and that the issuer's duty should be limited to
precautions taken in good faith provided for in paragraph (f)
below. To render the exemption unavailable to the issuer because
security holders resell any part of the issue to nonresidents within
the nine months period makes the issuer subject to actions by
purchasers over which it has no control, even though it otherwise
has discharged its obligation under the rule. Again, this limitation
in the rule makes it a difficult rule to rely upon.
This author believes that the notion bf a prolonged holding
period (the one year rule prior to the adoption of rule 147) should
not have been perpetuated in rule 147, and its existence is only a
further hindrance to the availability of the exemption in small
business financing situations. It should be noted that Professor
Loss argues that the issuer should not be liable for prohibited
resales by the purchaser, assuming the issuer acted in good faith
and exercised due care. 3
Precautions Against Interstate Offers and Sales
Paragraph (f) of the rule provides that the issuer shall place a
legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the securities stating that the securities have not been registered under the
Act and setting forth the limitations on resale contained in paragraph (e); that the issuer shall issue stop transfer instructions to its
transfer agent, if any, with respect to the securities or, if the issuer
transfers its own securities, make a notation in the appropriate
record of the issuer and obtain a written representation from each
purchaser as to his residence.
6.

53. See Loss, supra note 19 at 604-605:
Unless the standard [for issuer liability] is one of due care - which includes reasonable
supervision of all selling agents and may well require something more than an
automatic acceptance of the buyer's [residency] representation - the exemption is
virtually read out of the statute. Perhaps it should be but that presumably is why
Congress sits. Meanwhile, although it is usually impractical to litigate with the
Commission when an issuer is primarily interested in completing its financing, a
seller against whom a claim is made for rescission or damages under § 12(1) would
be well advised tb defend if he thinks he used reasonable care.

19751

CAPITAL GROWTH DETERRENCE

The rule further provides that the issuer shall, in connection
with the issuance of new certificates for any of the securities that
are part of the same issue that are presented for transfer during
the time specified in paragraph (e) (nine months), take the steps
required as outlined above.
Finally, the issuer shall, in connection with any offers, offers
to sell, offers for sale or sales by or pursuant to this rule, disclose
in writing the limitations on resale contained in paragraph (e) and
all of the provisions outlined above.
Many of the comments submitted to the SEC prior to the
adoption of rule 147 questioned the wisdom of making the exemption dependent on the issuer satisfying all the mechanical provisions of this paragraph.
This author is less concerned about the burdens of mechanical
compliance, which are at least within the control of the issuer, than
about the nine months rule on resales, as to which the issuer has
no control.
The point the commentators attempted to make prior to the
adoption of rule 147 is that the rule's usefulness may depend upon
the ease with which it can be utilized by small businesses unsophisticated in the burdens of securities law compliance. Technical violations of these exemptions frequently raise more havoc with a
small business' ability to raise capital than create real securities
regulatory problems.
7. Use of Rule By Controlling Persons
One of the more anomalous aspects of the rule is that it is not
available to controlling persons. Preliminary Note 4 to the rule
indicates that controlling persons who want to sell securities pursuant to section 3(a)(1 1) may continue to do so in accordance with
applicable judicial and administrative interpretations. The effect of
this is to discourage the use of the exemption by controlling persons.
If the intrastate exemption would have been available to the
issuer, this author sees no reason why a controlling person should
not be able to avail himself of the same exemption, and the rule
should sanction such use rather than leave the controlling person
to the uncertainties of the prior law.
8. Conclusion
As is apparent from the above discussion, the criteria of the
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intrastate exemption has been objectified in rule 147. Unfortunately, in the objectifying process some of the concepts of the prior
law have been substantially narrowed.
For those issuers who can accomplish their financing within the
criteria of rule 147, the rule offers a safe harbor as opposed to the
uncertainties of the prior law (especially in view of the compliance
burdens of alternative rule 146 or residual section 4(2) of the Act).
Choosing to structure an intrastate financing under residual section 3(a)(11) of the Act on the basis of more liberalized criteria
than those provided in rule 147 seems hazardous.
The two principal burdens of rule 147 are the 80% "doing
business" tests and the nine month limitation on resales. These two
aspects of the rule restrict the use of the rule in situations where it
otherwise seems appropriate and do not allow for, "substantial
compliance." Presumably, this reflects the SEC's attitude that
more transactions should be structured under rule 146 because of
the disclosure obligations of that rule and fewer under rule 147
because of the absence of disclosure obligations.
This author questions whether the intrastate exemption should
be so narrowed in the area of private financings and hopes that the
SEC will focus on whether distinctions can be made in the application of rule 147 between so-called public financings and private
financings. Query, whether the 80% tests on "doing business" and
the nine month resale test might not be relaxed for private financings in order to make the exemption readily available in the first
instance which the 80% tests restrict and, once invoked, more
readily certain of application which the nine month resale rule
restricts.
III.

RULE

By

240:

EXEMPTION FOR LIMITED OFFERINGS

CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS

A. Background to the Rule
On January 24, 1975, the SEC adopted rule 24011 under the
Act, effective March 15, 1975. In its release adopting rule 240 the
SEC pointed out that the rule provides an exemption from registration for limited offers and sales of small dollar amounts of securities ($100,000 in a twelve month period) by an issuer that before
and after a transaction pursuant to the rule has no more than one
54. Rule 240 was adopted in SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5560 (Jan. 24, 1975), CCH
SEc. L. REP. 80,066 (the explanatory release hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 5560).
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hundred beneficial owners of its securities. The purpose of the rule
is to provide an exemption from the registration but not from the
anti-fraud or other provisions of the Act, for offers and sales that
take place in the raising of capital by small businesses where,
because of the small size and the limited character of the offering,
the public benefits of registration are too rem-ote. The rule is available for issuers only and not for resales of securities by affiliates
of the issuer or other persons. A Form 240 notice, reporting that
a sale has been made in reliance on the rule, must be filed not more
than once in each calendar year with the SEC's regional office for
the region in which the issuer's principal business operations are
conducted." In connection with the adoption of rule 240 and Form
240, the SEC has also adopted an amendment to rule 144 which
provides that securities sold pursuant to rule 240 are deeemed to
be "restricted securities" for the purpose of rule 144 and may,
therefore, be resold pursuant to its provisions if the other criteria
of rule 144 can be satisfied. 6
The SEC originally proposed rule 240 for comment in June of
1974. 57 In reponse to comments received, rule 240, as adopted, has
been revised in several respects. Among the revisions are: the deletion of the prohibition on the use of the rule by limited partnerships;58 the addition of a prohibition on use of the rule by investment companies registered, or required to be registered, under the
Investment Company Act of 1940;11 the elimination of the limitation on the number of purchasers; 0 the increase in the limitation
on the number of beneficial owners from 50 to 100;1 the change
in the period for calculating the aggregate amount of securities that
may be sold in reliance on the rule from a consecutive twelve
month period to the twelve months preceding each sale; 2 and the
broadening of the exclusions in calculating the $100,000 aggregate
amount of securities that may be sold under the rule.63
55. Id. at 1.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3), SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 2705A (the rule hereinafter cited as rule 144). But see text accompanying
note 97, infra, regarding the difficultues of small closely held businesses being able to
comply with rule 144.
57. Proposed rule 240, SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5499 (June 3, 1974), CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 79,804 (hereinafter cited as proposed rule 240).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Rel. No. 5560 at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at7.

62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 7.
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The SEC realized soon after the adoption of rule 146"1 that the
disclosure obligations and other compliance obligations of rule 146
were burdensome to small business financing. Pressure soon
mounted to create some relief for such financing. While rule 240
in its original form was far too restrictive, the rule, as adopted,
substantially provides the kind of relief small businesses needed
from the burdens of rule 146 compliance. At least those companies
or other issuers such as limited partnerships seeking to raise, on
an interstate basis, $100,000 in a twelve month period could sell
securities to one hundred persons before getting involved in either
the compliance obligations of rule 146, residual Section 4(2), Regulation A or the registration process generally. Certainly the
liberalized form of rule 240 as adopted, unlike the form in which
it was proposed, gives startup or similar companies an opportunity
to "start" without being hamstrung by the regulatory process.
The principal advantage afforded by rule 240 is the relief it
offers from the disclosure requirements of rule 146. Only those
who have grappled with the problems of small businesses making
the kind of disclosure required by rule 146 can appreciate the relief
that rule 240 offers to small businesses. This is not to say that small
companies should not furnish information to investors concerning
their operations and financial condition, but to provide that information in a form tantamount to a registration statement as required by rule 146 is quite another matter.
Disclosure will still be made by issuers seeking to use rule 240
for two reasons:
(1) To inform investors of the nature of the investment as a
means of marketing the securities.
(2) To establish some basis for the representations pursuant
to which the investment is made so as to avoid possible challenges
of fraud should the investment "sour." The exemption is not an
exemption from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act but only from
the registration provisions. 5
Rule 240 has been long due for the small business investment
community. The rule will greatly simplify small business financing
which, since the judicial and administrative narrowing of the sec64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974), SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), CCH FED.
L. REP. 1 2709 (the rule hereinafter cited as rule 146).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1974), preliminary note 1, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2358 D
(the rule hereinafter cited as rule 240).
SEC.
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tion 4(2) private offering exemption" and the adoption of rule 146,
has been fraught with the problems of attempting to comply with
those exemptions.
B.

Rule 240

1. Conditions to be Met
Issuers relying on rule 240 must meet all the terms and conditions of the rule.17 Moreover, the exemption provided by the rule
is an exemption only from the provisions of section 565 of the Act
which are the registration provisions and not the anti-fraud provisions. The issuer may not be an investment company registered or
required to be registered under the Investment Company Act of

1940.9 The SEC decided to make the rule unavailable to investment companies in view of the similar unavailability of Regulation
A under the Act" and the intrastate exemption under section
3(a)(l 1) of the Act to investment companies.7' The rule is only
available to issuers for offers and sales of their securities.7 1
2.

Limitation on Manner of Offering
Under rule 240 securities shall not be offered, offered for sale

66. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 285 (1935), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1740-2744, (setting
for the mechanical test including number of offerees (25), relationship of offerees to each
other and the issuer, the number of units offered, the dollar amount of the offering, and
manner of the offering); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (added sophistication and access); SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2770-2783;
Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971);
Henderson v. Hayden Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440
F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971) (offerees must be persons of exceptional business experience with
a position of regular access to all information); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Company, 463
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (offerees must have a relationship with the issuer that would give
them access to information). See also SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970), CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 2784 (relating to use of legends and stop transfer instructions as evidence
of a non-public offering); SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972), CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP.
2785 (relating to applicability of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to
the offer and sale of securities in non-public offerings).
67. Rule 240(b).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1974).
69. Rule 240(b).
70. SEC Reg. A, General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § 230.252(b)(2) (1974), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 2360 at 2625.
71. Section 24(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended [15 U.S.C. §
80a-24(d) (1974)], provides that § 3(a)(11) "shall not apply to any security of which a
registered investment company is an issuer." See also Rel. No. 4434, note 1, CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 2271.
72. Rule 240, preliminary note 5.
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or sold in reliance on the rule by any means of general solicitation
such as newspapers and other means of general advertising. 3 This
reflects the limited "private" nature of the financing upon which
the rule is premised.
3.

Prohibition on Remuneration Paid for Solicitation or for Sale
No commission or similar remuneration shall be paid or given
directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective buyer or in
connection with any sales of securities made in reliance on rule
240.71 There may be some disagreement in small business financing
circles whether commissions should be prohibited in these transactions, but frequently such financing is effected by the issuer's officers without commissions rather than by the use of investment
bankers, broker-dealers "r other agents. The prohibition is consistent with the attempt to confine this rule to unsophisticated selfexecuted small business financing. As the SEC points out in its
release on rule 240, the purpose of this prohibition is to assure that
securities sold under rule 240 are not offered or sold by the use of
"high pressure tactics or otherwise through organized securities
distribution media. '75 The use of organized securities distribution
media has historically been one factor, depending on the circumstances, that might be inconsistent with the private offering exemption. 76 On the other hand, certain Blue Sky laws have historically
permitted the payment of commissions in the type of transaction
covered by the rule, subject to limitations on the amount of the
commissions. 71 Perhaps experience under the rule will answer the
question of whether the rule's use will be restricted, where it is
otherwise appropriate, because of the prohibition against commissions.
4.

Limitations on Aggregate Sales Price
The aggregate sales price of all sales of securities of the issuer
in reliance on rule 240 or otherwise, without registration under the
Act, within the twelve months preceding the point in time immedi73.
74.
75.
76.
2783.
77.

Rule 240(c).
Rule 240(d).
Rel. No. 5560 at 7.
SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) at 2, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 2770See, e.g., Ill. Laws 1953, § 4G, S.H.A. ch. 121

, § 137.4G.
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ately after the last such sale shall not exceed $100,000.7

As originally proposed the twelve month period was, for purposes of determining the aggregate sales price, any consecutive

twelve month period.7 1 Under such a limitation an issuer might
have been forced to forego a legitimate transaction such as one
under rule 146, simply because a rule 240 transaction had been

made within the prior twelve months. As adopted, the rule provides
for a retrospective twelve month period. The SEC has noted that

a transaction which was exempt when made will not subsequently
be rendered non-exempt by a separate transaction which does not
meet the limitation on aggregate sales prohibited by the rule.80

The rule lists certain exclusions in computing the dollar amount
of securities which may be sold. Excluded are the following:
1. All securities of the issuer registei'ed or exempt from registration under the Act if such securities were sold prior to the
effective date of rule 240.11

2. The following securities if sold in reliance on an exemption
from registration other than this rule:
(a) Nonconvertible notes or similar evidences of indebtedness
representing a purchase money mortgage or issued to a bank, sav-

ings institution, trust company, insurance company, investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,

Small Business Investment Company or Minority Enterprise
Small Business Investment Company licensed by the United States
78. Rule 240(e). The rule sets forth the following three notes illustrating the calculation
of the aggregate sales price:
NOTE 1: The calculation of the aggregate sales price may be illustrated as follows.
If an issuer sold $50,000 of its securities on June 1, 1975 in reliance on the rule, and
an additional $25,000 on September 1, 1975, the issuer would be permitted to sell
only $25,000 more until June 1, 1976 since until that date the issuer must count both
prior sales toward the $100,000 limit. However, if the issuer made its third sale on
June 1, 1976, the issuer could sell $75,000 of its securities since the June 1, 1975 sale
would not be within the precding twelve months.
NOTE 2: If a transaction relying on the rule fails to meet the limitation on the
aggregate sales price, it does not affect the availability of the rule for the other
transactions considered in applying such limitation. For example, if the issuer in the
prior note made its third sale on May 31, 1976 in the amount of $30,000, the rule
would not be available for that sale; but the exemption for the prior two sales would
be unaffected.
NOTE 3: The calculation of the aggregate sales price would include all consideration
received for the issuance of securities of the issuer, including cash, services, property,
notes, or other consideration.
79. Proposed rule 240(0.
80. Rule 240(e) notes I and 2.
81. Rule 240(e)(1).
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Small Business Administration, or pension or profit sharing trust;82
or
(b) Securities sold to any promoter, director, executive officer
or full time employee. 3
Persons described in 2(b) but not the institutional lenders described in 2(a) count as beneficial owners under paragraph (f) of
the rule even in the event that the securities sold to such persons
are not includable in calculating the aggregate sales price of the
securities sold.14 A note to that section of the rule further points
out that nonconvertible notes must be included in the computation
of the aggregate sales price when such notes have been issued with
warrants or other rights enabling the purchaser to acquire an equity interest in the issuer.8 5
5. Limitation on Number of Beneficial Owners
Rule 240 provides that both immediately before and immediately after any transaction in reliance on the rule, the issuer shall,
after reasonable inquiry, have reasonable grounds to believe that
the securities of the issuer are beneficially owned by one hundred
or fewer persons.8 " The rule provides that the following shall be
deemed the same and not a separate beneficial owner for purposes
of computing the one hundred or fewer persons:
1. Any relative or spouse of a beneficial owner and any relative of such spouse who has the same residence as the beneficial
owner.
2. Any trust or estate in which the beneficial owner or any of
the persons related to him, as specified in subparagraphs 1 or 3
herein, collectively own 100 % of the beneficial interest (excluding
contingent interests);
3. Any corporation or other organization of which a beneficial owner or any of the persons related to him referred to above
collectively are the beneficial owners of all of the equity securities
(excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interests.8 7
The rule provides that there shall be counted, as one beneficial
owner, any corporation or other organization, except that if such
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Rule 240(e)(2)(i).
Rule 240(e)(2)(ii).
Rule 240(e)(2)(il).
Rule 240(e)(2)(i).
Rule 240(0.
Rule 240(0(1).
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entity was organized for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, each beneficial owner of the equity interests or equity
securities in such entity shall count as a separate beneficial owner.,
The rule further provides that there shall be excluded from the
computation of beneficial owners any owner of only a purchase
money mortgage and any bank, savings institution, trust company,
insurance company, investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Small Business Investment Company or Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company
licensed by the United States Small Business Administration, or
pension or profit sharing trust which purchases or holds only nonconvertible notes or similar evidences of indebtedness of the issuer." This latter exclusion does not apply to arrangements where
nonconvertible notes are issued with warrants or other rights enabling the purchaser to acquire an equity interest in the issuer.8
It is again noted in this section of the rule, that promoters,
directors, executive officers and full time employees are included
for purposes of calculating the number of beneficial owners.'
As originally proposed, the rule was limited to issuers with fifty
or fewer beneficial owners. More critically, the rule contained no
provision for any reasonable grounds for the issuer's belief concerning the number of beneficial owners of its securities. The obvious effect of the original proposal would have been to hold the
issuer strictly liable for the number of beneficial owners even
though the issuer acted conscientiously in attempting to control
transfers of beneficial interests. Ih its revised form, the issuer cannot lose its exemption by actions of third parties where, after reasonable inquiry, it has reasonable grounds to believe, and does
believe, that the securities are beneficially owned by one hundred
or fewer persons. This requires the issuer to act responsibly but
does not cause the issuer to lose its exemption because of irresponsible acts of third parties.
6.

Number of Purchasers
The proposed rule contained a limitation on the number of
persons who could purchase securities from the issuer in order to
88. Rule 240(0(2).
89. Rule 240(l)(3).
90. Rule 240(0(3) note 1.
91. Proposed rule 240(h).
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comply with the rule.12 In its original form, the rule limited the
number of such purchasers to twenty-five in any twelve month
period with special provisions for computing the number of purchasers. In response to many comments on the restrictive nature
of this limitation, the SEC, in adopting rule 240, eliminated the
limitation on the number of purchasers and, instead, increased the
number of beneficial owners from fifty to one hundred as the outside limitation on the number of ultimate purchasers permitted
under the rule. 3 The elimination of the number of purchasers was
a salutary amendment on the part of the SEC as was increasing
the limitation on the number of beneficial owners from fifty to one
hundred.
7.

Limitation on Resale
As to the availability of an exemption from registration for the
resale of securities acquired in a transaction pursuant to rule 240,
such securities shall be deemed to have the same status as if they
had been acquired in a transaction pursuant to the private offering
exemption (section 4(2)) of the Act and they cannot be resold
without registration under the Act or pursuant to an exemption
from registration. 4 The rule requires that the issuer shall exercise
reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the securities are
not underwriters within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act.
Such reasonable care shall include, but is not necessarily limited
to:
(1) Making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser
is acquiring the securities for his own account (or on behalf of other
persons);
(2) Informing the purchaser of the restrictions on resale;
(3) Placing a legend on the certificate, or other document
evidencing the securities being issued, to the effect that the securities have not been registered under the Act and setting forth or
referring to the restrictions on transferability and sale of the securities by virtue of their issuance in reliance on rule 240.
Comments to rule 240 as originally proposed raised questions
as to whether requiring a legend (a mechanical compliance) as an
element of the exemption was inconsistent with the intended "self92. Proposed rule 240(g).
93. Rule 240(f).
94. Rule 240(g).
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executing" nature of the rule for unsophisticated small businesses.
The SEC, in adopting rule 240, has retained the legend requirement probably as the only effective means of prohibiting a widespread redistribution of the securities issued. It must be remembered that failure to require such a legend raises serious questions
as to an issuer's ability to legally restrict transfers of its securities,
in view of the requirements of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code which requires that all restrictions on transfer of investment securities be "noted conspicuously" on the certificate evidencing the security. 5
Having the same status as securities acquired in a transaction
pursuant to section 4(2) of the Act renders such securities "restricted securities." Accordingly, in conjunction with the adoption
of rule 240, the SEC amended rule 144 to include within the definition of "restricted securities" securities acquired from an issuer in
a transaction in reliance on rule 240.1 Rule 144 would, therefore,
be available for the resale of securities acquired pursuant to rule
240 provided all of the other criteria of rule 144 can be satisfied.
It should be pointed out that the typical small business or startup
issuer availing itself of rule 240 will not be able to satisfy the
conditions of rule 144, requiring such issuer to be either registered
under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or to
otherwise satisfy the "other public information requirements" of
rule 144(c)(2).97 In addition, due to the requirement of rule 144 that
sales be made pursuant to unsolicited brokers' transactions," it is
unlikely that the issuer availing itself of rule 240 would have a
sufficiently active trading market (or any market at all) in its
securities so as to facilitate such unsolicited sales. The rule and
release adopting the rule imply that rule 144 is available when in
fact resales under rule 144 will only be possible in unusual circumstances and after the passing of at least the minimum holding
period under rule 144.11 In the SEC's release adopting rule 240 it
might have been pointed out that rule 144 is not likely to be available to "small" businesses using rule 240 and resales of securities
issued in such transactions will more likely have to be disposed of
under the Section 4(1) exemption of the Act which requires the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Investment Securities-Uniform Commercial Code, § 8-204.
Rel. No. 5560 at 1.
Rule 144(c)(2).
Rule 144(g).
Rel. No. 5560 at 1, 9.
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usual analysis as to whether the transaction involves an "underwriter."
Rule 237100 should also be considered for possible resales of

securities issued under rule 240.
8. Notice of Sale
The rule provides that during each calendar year, within ten
days after the close of the first month in which a sale in reliance
on the rule is made, the issuer shall file with the regional office of
the SEC for the region in which the issuer's principal business
operations are conducted three copies of a notice on Form 240
which shall be signed by a duly authorized officer of the issuer or
by a person acting in a similar capacity for a noncorporate issuer.101 The form need only be filed once in each calendar year.
Transactions which occur subsequent to the first use of the rule
would seem to be as significant as the first. Nevertheless, the notice
requirement extends only to the first use of the rule. Thus it appears that the SEC does not intend to use the forms in connection
with its enforcement procedures but merely intends to keep appropriate regional offices of the SEC apprised of the use of the rule
confiby issuers. The form is a public document. It is not treated
!2
dentially as is its counterpart under some Blue Sky laws. 1
Notwithstanding the requirement for filing Form 240, the exemption provided by rule 240 will be available for the first $100,000
of the securities sold by the issuer if the sale of such securities
complied with all the conditions of rule 240 other than the notice
requirement. 03 The exemption provided by rule 240 will not, how100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.237 (1972), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 2358A. Rule 237 effective
April 15, 1972, was adopted by the SEC in Release No. 33-5224 under section 3(b) of the

Act. Under that rule any person who is not an issuer, affiliate of the issuer or a broker or
dealer, and who has owned and fully paid for the securities for at least five years, is
permitted to sell an amount of securities not exceeding the lesser of the gross proceeds from
the sale of one percent of the securities of the class outstanding or $50,000 during any twelve
month period, reduced by the amount of any other sales pursuant to an exemption under

section 3(b) of the Act of rule 144 during the period. The sales must be made in negotiated
transactions other than through a broker or dealer and the person must file a notice with
the appropriate regional office of the Commission at least ten days before the sale. The
issuer of the securities must be a domestic organization which has been actively engaged in
business as a going concern for at least the last five years.
101. Rule 240(h).
102. Il1. Sees. Law of 1953, S.H.A. ch. 121 , § 137.4G.
103. Rule 240(h)(2).
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ever, be available for any subsequent sale of securities by such
issuer, unless such issuer files:
(I) Prior to such subsequent sale in reliance on rule 240 a
Form 240 covering the prior sale of all securities for which reliance
on rule 240 is claimed; and
(2) A Form 240 covering such subsequent sale.
As originally proposed Form 240 would have had to be filed
prior to the first sale." 4 In its revised form, a filing after the first
sale is satisfactory. However, there were many comments submitted to the SEC questioning the wisdom of the filing requirement
in any event at any time. In this regard it should be noted that rule
146, as originally promulgated, required a notice to be filed but
that requirement was deleted in the rule as adopted.' While retaining the filing requirement for rule 240, the SEC has attempted
to meet the objection to making the filing requirement an essential
element of the exemption (and having the exemption lost through
inadvertant failure to file) by providing that the exemption for the
first $100,000 will not be lost even if the Form 240 is not filed but
that subsequent invocations of the rule must have, as an essential
element of the exemption, the filing of Form 240. In this manner
the SEC has attempted to appease the commentators who objected
to the filing requirement being an element of the exemption without eliminating the filing requirement altogether. It is better that
the SEC went half way on this than not at all. However, the
experience of many securities law practitioners in dealing with
similar filing requirements for state Blue Sky law exemptions has
demonstrated that the filing of such a report or form is a trap for
the unwary and has been, as a practical matter, of little enforcement value.
9.

Form 240
Form 240 requires:
1. The name, address and telephone number of the issuer of
the securities sold.
2. Names of the executive officers, directors and promoters
of the issuer and of persons beneficially owning 10% or more of
the equity securities or interests of the issuer.
104. Proposed rule 240G).
105. Proposed rule 146(i), SEC Secs. Act Rel. No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.
79,108 and SEC See. Act Rel. No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 79,529.
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3. Title of the class of securities sold.
4. Aggregate sales price of unregistered securities sold within
the preceding twelve months computed in accordance with the rule.
Sales prior to March 15, 1975 need not be reported.
5. Number of persons who are beneficial owners of securities
of the issuer as of the date of the filing of the notice computed as
required by the rule.' 6
10.

Generally
As is true of all exemptions under the Act, rule 240 relates to
transactions exempted only from section 5 of the Act."0 7 It does not
provide any exemption from the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, from the civil liability of section 12(2) of the
Act or other provisions of the federal securities laws.108 Purported
reliance on the rule does not constitute any election foreclosing the
issuer from claiming the availability of any other applicable exemption.'"' The rule is available only to the issuer and is not available to affiliates or other persons for resales of the issuer's securities.110
The rule is not available to any issuer for any transaction
which, although in technical compliance with the rule, is part of a
plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the Act."1
While a transaction may be exempt pursuant to rule 240, the same
transaction may be part of a larger issue of securities and may
affect the availability of a different exemption for other transactions which are part of such larger issue.112 Accordingly, the criteria
relative to integration1 3 of transactions must be reviewed for this
type of transaction as well as for any other type of transaction
similarly exempted from the registration process.
The rule as originally proposed provided that it would not be
available for the offer of sale of interests in limited partnerships.,
In response to the many comments pointing out that there was
little basis for distinguishing between corporate or partnership is106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Form 240, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7427.
Rule 240, preliminary note 1.
Rule 240, preliminary note I.
Rule 240, preliminary note 3.
Rule 240, preliminary note 4.
Rule 240, preliminary note 5.
Rule 240, preliminary note 6.
SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), CCH FED.
Proposed rule 240(b).

SEC.

L. REP.

2770-2783.
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suers, the SEC revised the rule to permit partnerships to avail
themselves of the rule." 5 However, in the definition of securities of
the issuer, the rule provides that interests in partnerships with the
same or affiliated general partners as well as fractional undivided
interests in oil and gas rights created by the same or affiliated
persons would be considered to be securities of the same issuer."'
The effect of this definitional provision is that all sales of such
partnerships or entities having the above affiliation would have to
be aggregated in determining the amount sold and all purchasers
of interests in the partnerships or other entities would have to be
counted in calculating the number of beneficial owners. The SEC
states that the purpose of this provision is to avoid repeated use of
7
the rule by the same or related persons for a series of offerings."
It is of interest that this concept is diametrically opposed to its
counterpart in Regulation A which permits certain separate limited partnerships to use Regulation A notwithstanding similar affiliations."'
11.

Conclusion
This writer views the adoption of rule 240 as a salutary effort,
for the most part, by the SEC in creating a relatively safe harbor
for small business private financing with reasonably objective criteria. This has been needed for a long time. As the SEC states in
its release adopting rule 240,119 the legislative history of the Act
indicates that Congress was principally concerned in providing full
and fair disclosure in connection with more widely offered securities and the Congress recognized that there were certain situations
in which the protection afforded by the registration provisions of
the Act were not necessary. As stated in the House Report relating
to the Act, "the Act carefully exempts from its application certain
types of

. .

. securities transactions where there is no practical

need for its application or where the public benefits are too re20
mote."
The private offering exemption was one of the exemptions understood by Congress to involve no practical need for the applica115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Rel. No. 5560 at 5-6.
Rule 240(a)(1).
Rel. No. 5560 at 4.
Reg. A. rule 254(d)(4)(5).
Re]. No. 5560 at 2.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1933).
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tion of the registration provisions, or where the public benefits of
registration were too remote. Yet, ever since the Ralston Purina2
case, the smallest of interstate private financings had to be strained
through the private offering doctrine that, as years went by, became narrowed by judicial and administrative interpretations to
the point where it became tantamount to an institutional exemption. 2 One might argue that even the safe harbor of rule 146
imposes criteria on the private offering exemption never contemplated by Congress. The frustrations of the small businessman and
his legal counsel, accountants and other professional advisors cannot help but have dampened the small businessman's enthusiasm
for entrepreneurialship. Rule 240 is welcomed relief in this area.
Interestingly enough, one sometimes hears the comment that rule
240 simply sanctions small businessmen in defrauding the public
by not requiring them to make the disclosures required by rule 146.
While there is that opportunity, those possibilities are not reasons
to deny to other small business entrepreneurs a regulatory climate
in which small businesses can be started and nourished without the
regulatory process standing as an obstacle. As the SEC points out,
the adoption of rule 240 is in the form of an experiment and it is
hoped that the experiment proves successful.'2
It is pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Act that the SEC adopted
rule 240. Section 3(b) provides that the SEC may by rule, and
subject to such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, add any
class of securities to the securities exempted under section 3 of the
Act if it finds that the enforcement of the Act with respect to such
securities is not necessary in the public interest by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. It took the SEC a long time to perceive the need that is now
being met by rule 240, although section 3(b) has been part of the
Act since 1933.
IV.

THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION AND RULE

A.

146

Background to the Rule

Private financing of an interstate character has historically
been accomplished under the private offering exemption provided
in section 4(2) of the Act. Specifically, section 4(2) provides that
121. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
122. See note 66, supra.
123. Rel. No. 5560 at 9.
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"transacthe registration provisions of the Act shall not apply12to
4
tions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
While the statutory language of the exemption is simple
enough, the interpretative history of the exemption has been complicated,125 culminating in the SEC's adoption of rule 146 in
1974.126 The rule represents an attempt to objectify the standards
for the private offering exemption. The rule was necessary because
of recent court decisions which raised serious questions as to the
for the many financings that had
exemption's continued viability
2
.
exemption
the
upon
rely
to
The history of the interpretation of the exemption basically
involves four events: an opinion of the SEC's General Counsel in
release in
1935, 128 the Ralston Purina case in 1953, 12 an SEC
31
1972.1
in
case
Tobacco
Continental
the
and
1962,'1
The above four events will be briefly reviewed to trace the
development of the exemption to the point at which rule 146 was
adopted.
In 1935, the general counsel for the SEC, in a written opinion,
stated that the following factors were relevant to determining
whether the private offering exemption applied: the number of the
offerees, the relationship of the offerees to each other and to the
issuer, the number of units offered, the size of the offering and the
manner of offering. The general counsel also stated that under
ordinary circumstances an offering to less than approximately
twenty-five persons presumably did not involve a public offering
although the question is not to32be determined exclusively by the
number of prospective offerees.
124. Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1974).
125. See note 66, supra.
126. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5487 (April 23, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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(hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 5487).
127. Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1971); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Company of So. Car., Inc., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972); Henderson v. Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Lively v. Herschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
128. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 285 (1935), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 2740 (hereinafter
cited as Rel. No. 285).
129. See note 121, supra.
130. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 4552 (1962), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 2770-2783 (hereinafter cited as Rel. No. 4552).

131. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Company of South Carolina, Inc., 463 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1972).
132. Rel. No. 285 at 1.
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This gave rise to the popular "twenty-five person rule," and
from that time until 1953 it was generally thought that an offering
to not more than twenty-five persons (without much emphasis
being given to any other element of the exemption) was a private
offering within the meaning of the statute.
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided the Ralston Purina case.
While the availability of the private offering exemption was frequently being determined from a "numbers" point of view (number
of purchasers, or more appropriately, number of offerees), the
Ralston Purinacase rejected the relevance of numbers. The court
stated, in substance, that whether the exemption applied depended
on whether the offerees could fend for themselves. The Court found
in Ralston Purina that the offerees could not fend for themselves
to the kind of
because it was not shown that they had "access"
33
information that registration would disclose.
In 1962, the SEC substantially reaffirmed the criteria, other
than the numbers test, which were contained in the general counsel's opinion of 1935 and suggested what was to be later reflected
in the Continental Tobacco case, that the exemption does not beare voluntarily furcome available merely because the offerees
34
nished information about the issuer.
As a practical matter, however, private financing continued to
be predicated (in noninstitutional offerings) essentially on the
twenty-five person test, augmented by concerns as to whether the
investors needed the protection of the Act and voluntary disclosure
in the form of private placement memoranda. In smaller unsophisticated transactions, private placement memoranda frequently
were not used at all as long as the numbers were relatively reasonable, and very little enforcement activity by the SEC was generated against the widespread use of the private offering exemption. Small and large companies alike continued to rely on it for
private financing with a variety of approaches being used by different issuers and their counsel according to what they then viewed
to be the status of the law. In 1972, however, the decision in Continental Tobacco challenged all past practices and raised serious
questions as to the legality of private offerings.
In Continental,securities were offered over a period of approx133. See note 121, supra at 127.
134. Rel. No. 4552.
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imately eighteen months to approximately thirty-eight offerees, of
whom thirty-five became investors of an aggregate amount of approximately $140,000. All of the purchasers had received information concerning the issuer and its financial condition and had access to any additional information. In its briefs on appeal, the SEC
argued that each offeree must have a relationship to the company
which was tantamount to that of an insider in terms of his ability
to know, to understand and to verify for himself all of the relevant
facts.
The Court of Appeals substantially adopted the SEC's argument and found that the record did not establish that each offeree
had a relationship with the issuer that provided access to the kind
of information that registration would have disclosed, and that the
issuer failed to prove that the offerees enjoyed a relationship with
15
the issuer making registration unnecessary.
Most securities practitioners examining the Continental
Tobacco case, particularly the SEC's briefs, were dismayed to
discover that much of the private financing with which they were
associated could not meet the standards of the case.
It was in this climate that pressure mounted on the SEC to
objectify and simplify the private offering exemption. It was hoped
that, in the process, some of the earlier flexibility could be returned
so that the private offering would not be restricted to use in only
institutional or specialized financing. The SEC's response was rule
146.
In November of 1972, the SEC published rule 146 for comment.13 1 In response to many comments the rule was substantially
revised and republished in October of 1973.137 In April of 1974 it
was adopted to become effective June 10, 1974, and in May, 1975,
3
the rule was post effectively amended. 1
B. Rule 146
1. Conditions to be Met
The rule makes it clear that if a transaction meets all of the
conditions of the rule, it shall be deemed to be a transaction not
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of
the Act. 3 1 Preliminary note 6 to the rule indicates that the rule is
135. See note 131, supra, at 161.
136. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,108.
137. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,529.
138. SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5487 (April 23, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2710; SEC
Sec. Act Rel. No. 5585 (May 7, 1975), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,168.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (1975) (hereinafter cited as rule 146). The rule provides an
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available only to the issuer and is not available to affiliates or other
persons for the sale of the issuer's securities. The purpose of the
rule is to provide a safe harbor for transactions complying with the
objective criteria of the rule. Unfortunately, "substantial" compliance is not enough. The difficulties of complete compliance will be
reviewed below.
2. Limitations on Manner of Offering
The rule prohibits the issuer or any person acting on its behalf
from offering or selling securities by means of any form of general
solicitation or general advertising including, but not limited to: (1)
Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in a newspaper, magazine or similar medium, or broadcast
over television or radio; (2) Any seminar or meeting, except that
if the persons attending such seminars are qualified offerees or
accompanied by an offeree representative, then the seminars or
meetings shall not be deemed a form of general solicitation or
general advertising; (3) Any letter, circular or notice, or other
written communication, except that if directed to qualified offerees
or their offeree representatives, such communication shall be
deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertis40
ing.1
The prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising is consistent with the historical view of the private offering
exemption.' 4' There seems to be little quarrel with the provisions
that advertisements, articles, notices or other communication published in newspapers, magazines or similar media, or broadcast
over television or radio, are inconsistent with the private nature of
the exemption. While there may be some quarrel with some of the
aspects of the provisions of the rule relating to attendance at seminars or meetings, generally the provision that seminars or meetings
may be held for qualified offerees or their offeree representatives
exemption from the nature of offerees (rule 146(d)) and the requirement to obtain a written
agreement from the purchaser (rule 146(b)(4)), for business combinations. The special
provisions relating to such transactions have not been discussed in this article as the author
has limited his discussion to private financing not typically accomplished through business
combinations.
140. Rule 146(c).
141. Rel. No. 4552.
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seems reasonable. In the past, holding seminars or reasonably
large meetings was considered risky, even if attended solely by
persons who under the rule would now be qualified offerees. This
portion of the rule makes it clear that general advertising is not
permitted (which was always assumed to be the case), but it may
create additional flexibility in approaching prospective investors by
sanctioning the holding of seminars and meetings even though they
must be limited to qualified offerees. Furthermore, permitting letters, circulars or other written communications to be provided to
qualified offerees removes the many questions concerning the permissibility of those types of communications in past financings.
3. Nature of Offerees
Under the rule, the issuer must have reasonable grounds to
believe and must believe that the offeree can fend for himself both
prior to the making of any offer and prior to any sale. Specifically,
the issuer and any person acting on its behalf who offers or sells
securities must have reasonable grounds to believe and must believe:
1. Immediately prior to making any offer, either:
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment; or
(ii) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the
economic risk of the investment and
2. Immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry, either:
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment; or
(ii) that the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that they are capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment and that the
offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.'
The SEC points out that the determination of "ability to bear
the economic risk" will vary with the circumstances. Important
142. Rule 146(d).
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considerations bearing on such a determination are whether the
offeree could afford to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite
period, and whether, at the time of the investment, he could afford
a complete loss.
Apparently the reason for adding the explicit language requiring reasonable inquiry prior to making the sale, as opposed to
making an offer (where that language does not appear), is to cover
the situation where, as the result of inquiry after the offer, but
before the sale, the issuer discovers that the offeree was not qualified. In that situation the rule is still available for the transaction
generally, if, in fact, the issuer had reasonable grounds to believe
and believed, immediately prior to making the offer, that the offeree was qualified. The SEC, in its release covering the adoption
of rule 146, offers the preceding as an explanation for the reasonable inquiry language preceding the sale. It further points out that
the same result would follow if the issuer discovered after a sale
that the purchaser did not in fact meet the standards of subparagraph (d)(2) as long as the issuer had reasonable grounds to believe, and believed, that the offeree met the standards of subparagraph (d)(2).113 The question not answered is how an issuer can
have reasonable grounds to believe and so believe, prior to making
an offer, without making "reasonable inquiry."
The principal problem involved in this part of the rule is the
burden placed on the issuer to determine the nature of the offerees.
The satisfaction of this element of the rule seems fraught with
uncertainty. Issuing opinions on this aspect of the rule will pose
many difficulties for counsel. Requiring the issuer to have reasonable grounds to believe and actually believe, prior to making any
offer, that the offeree has the sophistication or the economic net
worth sufficient to meet the subjective tests of the rule appears to
create an investigative burden that is inconsistent with the objectifying purposes of the rule.
The disclosure required by rule 146 is tantamount to a registration statement. Yet issuers in registered offerings do not have the
investigative burden imposed by rule 146 with respect to the nature
of the offeree (admittedly, however, the underwriters and members
of the selling syndicate have obligations to "know their customer"
and provide for the "suitability" of the investment). One has to
143. SEC See. Act Rel. No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974) at 6-7, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

at 2907-7, -8.
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question whether the private offering exemption as originally con-

ceived by Congress contemplated the kind of safeguards for private
financing of the nature found in that part of the rule dealing with
the nature of the offerees.'"

In view of the present economic climate and the difficulties in
raising private capital, it occurs to this author that perhaps we
ought to stand back from the historical interpretative development
of the private offering exemption and its gradual narrowing and

culmination in rule 146, and simply raise the broad question of
144. The genesis for the SEC's double-barrel requirement in rule 146 of disclosure
tantamount to registration and a "qualified" status for offerees is in the SEC's statement
in its release adopting rule 146 in which the SEC characterizes the Ralston Purinadecision
as establishing two criteria for determining the availability of the section 4(2) exemption,
i.e., whether the offerees have access to the same kind of information that registration would
disclose and whether they are able to fend for themselves. This author suggests that a careful
reading of the Ralston Purina case does not lend itself to the establishing of these two
separate criteria. Rather, this author believes that Ralston Purina more narrowly stands
for the proposition that the test of the private offering exemption is whether the offerees
have access, by virtue of a special relationship to the issuer, to the kind of information the
Act would make available in the form of a registration statement. The holding of Ralston
Purinawas that the employees there were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose and therefore the exemption was unavailable; that
the "fend for themselves" language was merely a general labelling by the court earlier in
the opinion of the specific test developed and applied to the facts of that case. For example,
the court stated as follows:
. . . [W]e agree that some employee offerings may come within section 4(1), e.g.,
one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the
same kind of information that the Act would make available in the form of a
registration statement. Absent such a showing of special circumstances, employees
are just as much members of the investing "public" as any of their neighbors in the
community.
The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded
by registration. The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose.
Thus, the Court is focusing on the access test and the access test depends on the special
relationship. The author believes this is what the court is referring to by being able to fend
for yourself, Le., do you have a special relationship that gives you access to information
tantamount to that which would be contained in a registration statement. The opinion does
not seem to be requiring an additional general element of sophistication or economic net
worth. Accordingly, if the access test or the alternative disclosure test is made a condition
of rule 146 (access being predicated only on the special relationships set forth in the rule),
then it seems the test of Ralston Puina has been totally satisfied and there is no need to
create an additional test. Whether sophistication or economic net worth should exist as an
element of the private offering exemption is a matter as to which people may disagree.
However, for the SEC to take the view that sophistication and economic net worth as
additional tests to access had their genesis in the holding in Ralston Purinais to clothe the
SEC's position with authority not deserved.
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whether the SEC, the courts and even securities law practitioners

themselves have not all contributed to a narrowing of the private
offering exemption beyond what was ever intended.
This author questions the appropriateness of continuing to add

burdens on private financing which are not present in the registration process.
There was concern for offerees in the past because there was
no statute or rule requiring disclosure tantamount to registration.
However, now that rule 146 in effect adopts the registration re-

quirements for disclosure in private financing, why should the issuer lose the exemption because it cannot sustain the burden rule

146 imposes on the issuer regarding the subjective tests retained by
the rule concerning the nature of the offerees?
4.

Offeree Representative
The rule introduces the innovative concept of the offeree repre-

sentative which permits offers and sales to offerees who do not
meet the sophistication test, but who have the ability to bear the
economic risk of the investment, if such offerees retain a representative who is capable of evaluating the investment.' As in the case
145. The term "offeree representative" is defined in subparagraph (a)(1) of the
Rule as a person who the issuer and any person acting on its behalf have, after
making reasonable inquiry, reasonable grounds to believe, and believe, is not an
affiliate, director, officer or other employee, or beneficial owner of 10% or more of
the equity of the issuer (except when the offeree is a specified relative of such person
or a trust or organization with which such person and/or such relative has a specified
relationship) (subdivision (i)); has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment (subdivision (ii)); is acknowledged, in writing, by the offeree during
the course of the transaction to be his offeree during the course of the transaction to
be his offeree representative (subdivision (iii)); and discloses to the offeree, in writing,
any material relationship existing or mutually understood to be contemplated between himself or his affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates or any such relationship
which existed during the previous two years, and any compensation received as a
result of such relationship (subdivision (iv)). As was noted in the Release accompanying the Rule as proposed for comment in October 1973, the acknowledgment and
disclosure of relationships must be made with respect to each prospective investment,
even in the case of a discretionary account. Where an adviser with discretionary
authority wants to act as offeree representative, the Rule requires that the acknowledgment specified in subdivision (a)(l)(iii) of the Rule be obtained for each transaction. Accordingly, advance blanket acknowledgment for "all securities transactions"
or "all private placements" or similar broad advance acknowledgments will not
satisfy the Rule. This is particularly important, since the offeree representative is
required by subdivision (a)(l)(iv) of the Rule to disclose to the offeree, in writing,
any material relationships between the adviser and the issuer. This disclosure is
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of the nature of the offerees, the knowledge and experience criteria
relative to the offeree representative remains subjective and presents the same problems to the issuer as the resolution of whether
or not its offerees are qualified. The concept of the offeree representative and the standards set forth for his knowledge and experience raise several questions for the issuer. For example, will the
offeree representative be held to a more stringent qualification
standard than the offeree under the rule, or is the offeree representative an investment adviser? While it appears clear that the offeree representative could be held liable for fraud, it is not clear
whether he could be liable for a merely negligent analysis. Will the
standard applicable to the offeree representative be higher than
that of an ordinary broker recommending an investment?
The practicalities of the rule indicate that the issuer should
determine prior to the sale if an offeree requires an offeree representative, and if he does, whether the offeree can bear the economic
risk. The question then arises as to whether it is appropriate for
the issuer to recommend an offeree representative, or to pay his
fees. In this connection it should be noted that the rule requires that
the offeree representative disclose to the offeree, in writing prior
to the offeree's acknowledgment of the offeree representative, material relationships between the issuer and the offeree representative. The issuer's duty of disclosure in this respect arises prior to
the sale.
It remains to be seen what role the offeree representative, as
structured within rule 146, will play in the practical realities of
private financings under the rule. In the typical private placement,
where an investment banker is performing the customary investment banking function, will the investment banker bring in an
independent investment banker to function as an offeree representative? Will the additional fee of the offeree representative in the
typical private placement permit the use of an independent offeree
representative? Will the reality of the cost of the financing force
the investment banker to function as the offeree representative?
required in connection with each offering pursuant to th.e Rule in order that the
offeree be given an opportunity to consider any conflicts of interest the adviser may
have prior to acknowledging the adviser as his offeree representative for the particular offering. A Note has been added to the offeree representative definition making
clear that where an offeree representative or its affiliates has a material relationship
with the issuer or its affiliates, disclosure of such relationship does not relieve the
offeree representative of its obligation to act in the interest of the offeree.
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What conflicts of interest arise if the investment banker, primarily
representing the issuer, attempts to function in the capacity of a
representative of the offeree who, at least theoretically, is in a
position diametrically opposed to that of the issuer? Can there be
an inadvertent offeree representative with whatever liabilities attach to that position? Is the exemption jeopardized if an offeree
does not follow the recommendation of the offeree representative?
Hopefully, the answer to these questions will not deter the use
of what seems to be a desirable concept (accepting the premises of
the rule requiring qualified offerees).
5. Access to or Furnishing of Information
In addition to providing strict requirements on the nature of the
offerees, the rule further provides that either each offeree shall
have access during the course of the transaction and prior to the
sale to the same kind of information that is specified in Schedule
A of the Act (to the extent that the issuer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense) or
that each offeree or his offeree representative, or both, shall have
been furnished such information during the course of the transaction and prior to sale by the issuer or any person acting on its
behalf.46
In the case of an issuer that is subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act"), this requirement shall be deemed to have
been satisfied if the offeree or his offeree representative is furnished, either in the form of documents actually filed with the SEC
or otherwise, the information contained in the annual report required to be filed under the Exchange Act, or a registration statement on Form S-1 under the Act or on Form 10 under the Exchange Act (whichever filing is the most recently required to be
filed), and the information contained in any definitive proxy statement required to be filed pursuant to section 14 of the Exchange
Act and in any reports or documents required to be filed by the
issuer pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act since
the filing of such annual report or registration statement. In addition, the issuer shall provide a brief description of the securities
being offered, the use of the proceeds from the offering, and any
146. Rule 146(e)(1).
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material changes in the issuer's affairs which are not disclosed in
the documents furnished.'47
In the case of all other issuers, i.e., non-reporting companies,
the information necessary to satisfy the disclosure requirements is
the information that would be required in a registration statement
filed under the Act on the form which the issuer would be entitled
to use, provided: (1) that if the issuer does not have the audited
financial statements required by such form and cannot obtain them
without unreasonable effort or expense, such financial statements
may be provided on an unaudited basis; and (2) provided that if
such unaudited financial statements are not available and cannot
be obtained without unreasonable effort or expense, the financial
statements required by Regulation A under the Act may be furnished; and (3) if the financial schedules required by Part II of the
registration statement have not been prepared, they need not be
furnished. The exhibits required to be filed with the SEC as part
of a registration statement or report need not be furnished to each
offeree or offeree representative if the contents of the exhibits are
identified and such exhibits are available upon request. 4
Regardless of whether the issuer is a reporting or non-reporting
company, the issuer must provide, during the course of the transaction and prior to sale, to each offeree or his offeree representative,
or both, the opportunity to ask questions of and receive answers
from the issuer concerning the terms and conditions of the offering
and to obtain any additional information (to the extent that the
issuer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense) necessary to verify the accuracy of the
information furnished in the basic disclosure made. 4'
In addition to the information required to be furnished regarding the issuer, the issuer is required to disclose to each offeree, in
writing, prior to sale:
(i) any material relationship between his offeree representative or its affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates, which then
exists or mutually is understood to be contemplated or which has
existed at any time during the previous two years, and any compensation received as a result of such relationship;
(ii) that a purchaser of the securities must bear the economic
risk of the investment for an indefinite period of time because the
147. Rule 146(e)(1)(a).
148. Rule 146(e)(1)(b).
149. Rule 146(e)(2).
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securities have not been registered under the Act and therefore
cannot be sold unless they are subsequently registered under the
Act or an exemption from such registration is available;
(iii) the limitations on disposition of the securities set forth
in the rule.15
A note to this part of the rule points out that the information
required to be furnished by the rule need not be provided and an
opportunity to obtain additional information need not be continued to be provided to any offeree or offeree representative who,
during the course of the transaction, indicates that he is not interested in purchasing the securities offered, or to whom the issuer or
any person acting on its behalf has determined not to sell securities.
For companies registered and reporting under section 13 or
15(d) of the Exchange Act, the required disclosure should not be
too burdensome simply because the disclosure can be basically
satisfied from the reporting disciplines of those companies. However, for all other issuers throughout the country that must rely on
private financing, the burdens of preparing information tantamount to an S-1 registration statement are likely to deter the
financing in the first instance. The issuer has the additional burden
of assuring that the offerees are qualified offerees meeting all of
the stringent criteria for offerees. One might well ask whether this
process is simpler than registration. Nowhere in the history of the
development of section 4(2) was it suggested that the private offering exemption ought to have more stringent requirements than
registration. 1 '
Should the SEC's paternalism, if conceded for purposes of
public registered offerings in interstate securities markets, extend
down to the private financing of various size issuers throughout the
country who cannot rely on the intrastate exemption or rule 240
and must accomplish their private financing under the federal
private offering exemption? Have investors come to expect the
same kinds of protections from the government in purchasing
securities in private transactions as they have in registered offerings? Are not the private capital markets by their very nature
150. Rule 146(e)(3).
151. It should be noted that the SEC has afforded considerable relief from the disclosure
requirements of rule 146 to those small companies that can avail themselves of recently
adopted rule 240. In rule 240 the SEC has finally adopted a rule that recognizes the intent
of the private offering exemption as an exemption from registration, not a process similar
to or more burdensome than registration.
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known to be fraught with substantial risks requiring investors to
satisfy themselves by one means or another as to the nature of
the investment? Must the law burden the issuer with such strict
requirements that it becomes almost impossible to accomplish
many forms of private financing with the certainty of a wellfounded exemption? It should be remembered that this exemption
is not an exemption from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act.
While it is true that the rule provides, in the alternative, that"
qualified offerees shall either be furnished the information discussed above or have access to such information, what issuer, even
in institutional financing, is going to rely on being able to prove
that the offerees had the type of access contemplated by the rule?
The nature of the choice almost requires issuers to furnish the
disclosure so as to prove its compliance with this part of the rule.
Furthermore, the rule points out that access can exist only by
reason of the offeree's position with respect to the issuer, defining
position to mean an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain information from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.
It occurs to this author that we are likely to wind up with a very
tight and strict set of rules, regulations and law pertaining to the
private issuance of securities but not have any private entrepreneurs left who have either the inclination or the ability to meet
these burdens.
6. Number of Purchasers
The rule provides that the issuer shall have reasonable
grounds to believe, and after making reasonable inquiry shall
believe, that there are no more than thirty-five purchasers of
the securities of the issuer in any "offering" under the rule. 52 The
rule further provides that an "offering" (which is not otherwise
defined) shall be deemed not to include offers or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided by sections
3 or 4(2) of the Act or to a registration statement filed under the
Act that take place prior to the six month period immediately
preceding or after the six month period immediately following
any offers or sales pursuant to this rule, provided that there are
during neither of said six month periods any offers or sales of
securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as those
offered.153 In the event that securities of the same or similar class'"
152. Rule 146(g).
153. Rule 146(b)(1).
154. The rule as proposed in Rel. No. 5430 limited purchases of all classes of the issuers'
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as those offered pursuant to the rule are offered less than six
months prior to or subsequent to any offer or sale pursuant to the
rule, the usual rules for integration apply as to whether any such
other sales shall be deemed part of the offering pursuant to the
rule.
Basically, the period provided by the rule is a twelve month
period although the period could be longer because the six month
period runs from the earliest offer and the latest sale.
As to the number of purchasers, the rule further provides that,
for purposes of computing the number of purchasers, the following
purchasers shall be excluded:
(a) Any relative or spouse of a purchaser and any relative of
such spouse who has the same home as such purchaser;
(b) Any trust or estate in which a purchaser or any of the
persons related to him collectively have 100 percent of the beneficial interest (excluding contingent interests);
(c) Any corporation or other organization of which a purchaser or any of the persons related to him as specified in (a) and
(b) above collectively are the beneficial owners of all of the equity
securities (excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interest; and
(d) Any person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash, in a single payment or installments, securities of
the issuer in the aggregate amount of $150,000 or more."'
The rule further provides that any corporation, partnership or
other association or organization shall be counted as one person,
except that if such entity was organized for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered, each beneficial owner of equity
interest or equity securities in such entity shall count as a separate
purchaser. Furthermore, clients of an investment adviser, customers of a broker or dealer, trusts administered by a bank trust
department, or persons with similar relationships, shall be considered to be the offerees or purchasers for purposes of the rule regardless of the amount of discretion given to the investment adviser, broker or dealer, bank trust department or person to act on
behalf of the client, customer or trust.1 5
One of the salutary features of rule 146 is that it does not have
securities to thirty-five persons during any twelve month period. The rule as adopted applies
only to securities of the same or similar class.
155. Rule 146(g)(2)(i).
156. Rule 146 (g)(2)(ii).
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a limitation on the number of offerees. The number of offerees was
always critical to whether a private offering became a public offering under the private offering exemption prior to rule 146. The rule
eliminates a very troublesome and difficult matter to control in
private financing.
As to the limitation on the number of purchasers, there are
differing view points on whether thirty-five people is an adequate
number of people for essentially a twelve month period. At least
the rule does provide a precise number test and, when combined
with rule 240, probably provides sufficient flexibility, in terms of
the number of purchasers, necessary to carry out meaningful private financing. Certainly this is the type of number that issuers in
noninstitutional financing have been used to, and so it does not
introduce a new element to the private offering exemption but
rather seems to objectify what was probably a long-standing practice before the rule.
One problem with the numerical limitation of the rule as originally adopted was the absoluteness of the condition. It made the
issuer a guarantor of the number of purchasers when it was not
able to completely control the number. A recent amendment to the
rule adopted a "reasonable grounds to believe" test that, combined
with the precautions imposed on the issuer by subsection (h) of the
rule, removes the issuer from being a guarantor and still accomplish the purpose of the rule.
7. Limitations on Disposition
The issuer must exercise reasonable care to assure that the
purchasers of the securities in a rule 146 offering are not underwriters within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. The rule provides that such reasonable care shall include, but not necessarily
be limited to, the following:
1. Making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser
is acquiring the securities for his own account or on behalf of other
persons;
2. Placing a legend on the certificate, or other document evidencing the securities, stating that the securities have not been
registered under the Act and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability and sale of the securities;
3. Issuing stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer
agent, if any, with respect to the securities or if the issuer transfers
its own securities, making a notation in the appropriate records of
the issuer; and
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4. Obtaining from the purchaser a signed written agreement
that the securities will not be sold without registration under the
Act or exemption therefrom.157
There has been some criticism of the requirements for the mechanics set forth in this part of the rule such as placing a legend
on the certificate, issuing stop transfer instructions and obtaining
investment letters. However, these burdens seem small compared
to the burden of the disclosure required by rule 146 on nonreporting issuers and the burden of establishing qualified offerees.
Most private financing on an interstate basis does involve the use
of legends, the use of stop transfer instructions and investment
letters. It might be more forceably argued that such mechanical
restrictions should not be part of rule 240 transactions which are
intended to be self-executing for small, unsophisticated businesses.
The problem posed by mechanical compliance is that failure to
comply with these requirements for one investor presumably
makes the exemption unavailable for the entire transaction.
Fortunately, in the area of mechanical compliance the SEC has
deleted the requirement that a report of sale be filed. This is a
salutary amendment to the rule as proposed. The requirement of
filing such reports in connection with Blue Sky private offering
exemptions has frequently proved to be a trap for the unwary.
8. Conclusion
It may be that experience will demonstrate that a further delineation is necessary in the SEC's rule-making for the private offering exemption. Rule 146 may attempt to accomplish too much in
that it attempts to cover the institutional private placement as well
as all other types of private offerings (other than rule 240 transactions). In addition to rule 240, there may well be room for further
delineations, one covering institutional financing, one covering financings by reporting companies and one covering financings of
non-reporting companies (other than rule 240 transactions). This
author would like to suggest that while rule 240 is a step in the right
direction in recognizing that there are different types of private
offerings under the private offering exemption, the SEC should
give further consideration to whether rule 146 is a suitable vehicle
for covering all other kinds of private financings. Can one rule
adequately deal with all such financings? It is no answer to suggest,
157. Rule 146(h).
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as the SEC does in preliminary note 1 to rule 146, that residual
section 4(2) is available for those transactions that cannot be structured within the rule. In view of the uncertainty of the law under
section 4(2) the SEC owes it to all those whose transactions must
be accomplished under the private offering exemption to have the
benefit of the safe harbor provided by rule 146 for transactions
covered by it. The other transactions should not be ignored. If one
rule cannot adequately cover all of the transactions to be covered,
why can't other supplementary rules be adopted so that the entire
spectrum of private financing has the benefit of a safe harbor?
C. Residual Section 4(2)
Rule 146 is expressly non-exclusive, leaving the exemption provided by section 4(2) of the Act available to those issuers that
comply with the administrative and judicial interpretations in effect at the time of any proposed offering under section 4(2). 1ss
Many securities lawyers, however, are concerned that rule 146,
although non-exclusive, will become functionally exclusive such
that all offerings (except those limited to institutions) sought to be
made as "private offerings" under section 4(2) will have to be made
in full compliance with rule 146. Those who anticipate this development point to certain pre-rule 146 cases to illustrate the peril of
proceeding other than pursuant to an express safe harbor such as
rule 146.159 However, those cases, by and large, represent flagrant
violations of the registrational requirements of the Act. It is submitted that, in addition to being available for institutional offerings, section 4(2) will provide an exemption for offerings which are
made, as a practical matter, in substantial compliance with rule
146 but which fail to meet one of the specific technical requirements of the rule (e.g., where an issuer has held a meeting with
non-qualified offerees in attendance contrary to rule 146 (e)(2)).
It may be anticipated, of course, that some courts will find the
convenience of the standards contained in rule 146 too great a lure
158. Preliminary note I to rule 146. The SEC has noted in the release adopting the rule
that attempted compliance with the rule does not act as an election. The issuer can also

claim the availability of section 4(2) outside the rule.
159. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Company of So. Car., 463 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Hayden Stone Inc., 448 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Lively v.

Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); Bowers v. Columbia General
Corporation, 336 F. Supp. 609 (D.C. Del. 1971); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119

(1953).
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to resist. Therefore, from a planning standpoint, issuers which
must rely on the private offering exemption should painstakingly
seek to comply with rule 146, as burdensome and difficult as that
may be. The statutory exemption should be used only as a backstop.
It is difficult to say with certainty what constitute the criteria
for compliance with residual section 4(2), due to the SEC's failure
to provide any guidelines and the absence of any significant postrule 146 case law relating to compliance with either rule 146 or
section 4(2). The situation remains, as SEC Chairman Garrett
characterized it while still in private practice, "a kind of mishmash."'6 0 In any event, there seem to be three broad criteria: the
offering must be conducted in a limited manner, the offerees must
be qualified, and the offerees must have access to, or be furnished
with, certain information concerning the investment.
1. Limited Manner of Offering
The fundamental proposition governing the manner in which
an offering must be conducted is that there must be direct contact
between the issuer and each offeree as opposed to general solicitation or general advertising.'
The number of offerees is probably still a significant factor in
determining whether an issuer has engaged in general solicitation,
notwithstanding the holdings of the Supreme Court to the contrary.6 2 Drawing on the substantial pre-rule 146 law, the rule of
thumb here is a negative one: as the number of offerees increases,
the inference grows stronger than an offering is public, i.e., that
some public solicitation or advertising, as opposed to the required
private, direct contact between issuer and offerees, has occurred.
On the other hand, an offering to a small number of offerees does
not support the inference that an offering is private.'63 Rule 146
has the advantage of certainty on this point, as the rule contains
no limitation on the number of offerees. Query, whether the number of offerees will decrease in importance in determining the availability of section 4(2) for transactions effected outside the rule. At
160. PLI Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 10-11 (Garret, Mundheim,
Fleischer and Schuper eds. 1973).

161. See Rel. No. 4552 at 2.
162. See note 129, supra, at 125.
163. See Garrett, "The State of the Law Outside Rule 146," PLI's Course Handbook
The 140 Series (1973) (Order No. B4-3559).
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least for the present, it would appear that the number of offerees
remains a significant criterion in determining the availability of the
section 4(2) exemption.
As to the number of purchasers as another factor under residual section 4(2), whether post-rule 146 decisions will continue to
focus on the number of offerees as opposed to the number of
purchasers or follow the limitation to thirty-five purchasers in rule
146 without the former degree of concern for the number of offerees remains to be seen. Prudence dictates that an issuer continue
to focus on the number of offerees as opposed to purchasers and
that, in any event, it restrict its offering to thirty-five purchasers,
more or less, at least until there is more post-rule 146 experience
with the statutory exemption.
Qualified Offeree
A frequently held view of the pre-rule 146 law, and one championed by the SEC, is that an offeree must meet two separate tests,
namely, that he be "able to fend for himself" and that he either
have access to, or be furnished with, certain information concerning the proposed investment."' Prior to rule 146, the "fend" criterion has been variously interpreted to be satisfied by an offeree who
is "sophisticated," or "able to bear the economic risk of the investment," or both.'65 Rule 146 embodies a "fend" criterion for determining whether an offeree is qualified,' which is satisfied by an
offeree who is either sophisticated or is able to bear the economic
risk of the investment and is represented by an "offeree representative"' 67 who meets the sophistication test enunciated therein. It is
this author's view that the rule 146 "fend" criterion, with all of its
uncertainties, is likely to be imported into the statutory exemption
for purposes of determining whether the offeree is "qualified."
Some commentators have suggested that there may' or should
be'69 a third alternative test for determining compliance with the
"fend" criterion, namely, whether the offeree has a close personal,
family or employment relationship to the issuer. However, it is not

2.

164. See text accompanying note 144, supra.
165. See, e.g., Garrett, PrivatePlacements, THE REVIEW OF SECURtmEs REGULATION,

859, 863 (1972).
166. Rule 146(d).
167. Rule 146(a)(1).

168. Schneider, "Section 4(2) and 'Statutory Law'," Sixth Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation 104 (PLI Handbook No. 161, Fleischer and Mundheim eds. 1974).
169. Katz, Basic Criteria for Exemptions UnderSection 4(2), 172 N.Y.L.J. 115 (1974).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

clear whether this third suggested test is merely another means of
stating that the offeree has "access" or whether it is or should be
part of the "fend" criterion, as an alternative to the sophistication
and net worth tests.
3. Access To or Furnishing of Information
Access to the kind of information that registration would disclose will probably remain a critical test to the section 4(2) exemption.170 While the voluntary furnishing of such information to
"qualified" offerees, as an alternative to "access," has little support in the pre-rule 146 developed law, the permitted use of such
information in rule 146 as an alternative to the access test is likely
to influence its permitted use under residual section 4(2). To the
extent such information approximates that required of a registration statement, courts are likely to sanction its use as an alternative
to access. One might even predict that, except in institutional financing, courts in the future are more likely to view the voluntary
furnishing of information to offerees (with provisions for verification similar to rule 146) as a preferable means of satisfying the socalled access test than mere access itself which, except in institutional financing, is difficult of practical application and proof.
4.

Restrictions on Resale
It is essential to the availability of the exemption that the issuer
be reasonably certain that the offerees do not intend to resell their
securities publicly. The intent to resell publicly would be evidence
of participation in a distribution of securities and would cause the
purchaser to be deemed an "underwriter" within the meaning of
section 2(11) of the Act.
Resales by purchasers, when related back to the issuance of the
securities, could cause the original offering to be a public offering,
causing both the issuer and the person who resold to be in violation
of section 5 of the Act.
Although restrictions on resale are not necessary, as a matter
of law, to support the section 4(2) exemption, it is advisable that
the issuer maintain controls over the purchaser's right to resell. 7 '
170. From a planning point of view one cannot be unmindful of the SEC's,view articulated in rule 146 that access can only exist by reason of a special relationship to the issuer.
See rule 146(e).
171. The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC regards the presence or absence

of an appropriate legend and stop transfer instructions as a factor in considering whether
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The principal types of controls are: (1) written undertakings by
purchasers as to their nondistributive intent;1 12 (2) legends on stock
certificates; and (3) stop transfer orders to the issuer's transfer
agent or noted on the issuer's own transfer records.
5. Conclusion
This discussion of the section 4(2) exemption outside of rule
146 must conclude where it began with the observation that the
uncertainties of the pre-rule 146 law of section 4(2) will probably
discourage reliance on it outside of rule 146 in the future. As
suggested earlier in discussing rule 146, does it make sense to have
a safe harbor provided by rule 146 for transactions that can be
structured within that rule and leave residual section 4(2) available
for private offerings that cannot be structured within the rule? It
makes more senseto have a series of rules providing safe harbors
for the entire spectrum of private financing, each such safe harbor
made suitable for the particular financing intended to be covered.
V.

REGULATION

A

A review of the legal vehicles available for so-called private
financing would not be complete without at least a reference to
another exemption from the registration provisions of the Act,
namely, Regulation A. 73 It is not the purpose of this article to
focus in detail on Regulation A. Generally it is not an exemption
used for financing involving a limited number of investors, as are
the other exemptions considered in this article. It is more of a
hybrid of the types of exemptions considered in this article and the
full registered offerings under the Act.
the circumstances surrounding the offering are consistent with the exemption. SEC Sec. Act
Rel. No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970) at 2. In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corporation,
note 159, supra, the court held in commenting on such controls: "these are only precautions

(to prevent illegal distributions) and are not to be regarded as a basis for exemption from
registration."
172. Traditionally after passage of a period of time it was considered that the purchaser
had held the securities long enough to evidence that he had the requisite non-distributive

intent. The law, however, was fraught with uncertainty and subjectivity regarding length of
such period. In April, 1972 the SEC adopted rule 144 (17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1975)) which
provides, inter alia, objective standards for resales of securities, acquired in a private placement, if the issuer of such securities meets the conditions of the rule. The rule adopts a
general rule, subject to enumerated conditions, requiring a minimum two year holding
period. Rule 144(d)(1).
173. SEC Reg. A, General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933,
rules 251-263, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263 (1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 2360-2371 (hereinafter cited as Reg. A).
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The reason for mentioning Regulation A at all is that, in view
of the strict compliance requirements of rules 146 and 147 and the
uncertainty of properly invoking those exemptions, small businesses may want to take another look at the possible usefulness of
Regulation A, especially since in recent years its ceiling has been
increased from $300,000 to $500,000.171
Regulation A is a regulation pursuant to which securities not
exceeding $500,000 in the aggregate for the issuer and its affiliates
and $300,000 in the aggregate for non-affiliates may be offered
within a one year period. Unlike the exemptions considered in this
article, Regulation A is not self-executing and requires a filing
(with the regional office of the SEC having jurisdiction over the
issuer) of a notification1 75 (which is the Regulation A counterpart
of part II of the S-1 registration statement) and an exhibit called
an offering circular1 78 (which is the counterpart of the prospectus
of the S-1 registration statement). These documents are processed
in the regional office much like an S-1 registration statement is
processed in the Washington office of the SEC. Offers and sales
may be made only by the use of the offering circular as it has
become effective in the regional office. While the information required in the Regulation A offering circular is less burdensome
than that required by the S-1 registration statement, to minimize
challenges of fraud, offering circulars are frequently drafted to
make fuller disclosure than that required.
One of the principal differences between the Regulation A offering circular and the prospectus of the S-I registration statement
is in the financial statements required for the offering circular.
Regulation A does not require certified financial statements, unless
the issuer is registered under section 12(b) or (g) of the Exchange
Act or is required by an undertaking made for registration statements filed under the Act to file the reports required of section
12(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.17 What is required is a balance
sheet as of a date within ninety days prior to the date of filing and
174. Reg. A. rule 254 was amended effective April 15, 1972 in SEC Sec. Act Rel. No.
5225 (Jan. 10, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,485.
175. Reg. A. rule 255, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2363; Form I-A Notification under

Reg. A., CCH

FED.

SEC. L. REP.

7325.

176. Reg. A. rule 256, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. l 2364; Schedule I of Form 1-A, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 7327.
177. Item II of Schedule I of Form I-A, SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5225, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 7327 at 6446.
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a profit and loss statement and an analysis of surplus for at least
two full fiscal years prior to the date of the balance sheet and for
the period between the close of the last full fiscal year and the date
of such balance sheet. The period of the issuer's existence may be
17
used if it is less than the above period. 1
One of the principal problems in using Regulation A is coordination with the Blue Sky laws of the various states in which the
Regulation A offering is to be made. Regulation A is generally
used in situations where state Blue Sky exemptions are not applicable because of the public nature of the offering, and, consequently,
state registrations must be effected in the jurisdictions in which the
offering is intended to be made. Those jurisdictions, especially in
the midwest, typically require certified financials for "registered
offerings."'' 78 If the state Blue Sky laws had provisions for coordinating Regulation A offerings with the registration provisions of
such laws and did not require certified financials where Regualtion
A did not require certified financials, Regulation A would be a
more useful tool for small business financing.
For all practical purposes, this is a hybrid exemption between
private financing and registered financing for relatively small businesses. However, its usefulness is limited because of the differences
in the federal and state requirements for the financial statements.
As there are other articles setting forth comprehensively the
details of the Regulation A exemption, its elements, requirements
and the processing thereof, this article will not further consider the
nuances of that exemption." s0 It is appropriate, however, first, to
urge that Blue Sky laws be amended to permit a more effective
coordination of the Regulation A offering with the registration
provisions of the Blue Sky laws so that compliance with Regulation A would satisfy such laws, and second, to raise the question
as to whether the ceiling on Regulation A should not be increased
to perhaps $750,000 or $1,000,000 in view of the relative increase
in the size of financings in recent years.1"'
178. Id. Item 1l(a) and (b).
179. See, e.g., Il. Secs. Law of 1953, S.H.A. Ch. 121
L. REP. V 16,205.

§ 137.5C; 1 CCH BLUE SKY

180. See Coles and Hale, Regulation A: Small Business FinancingExemption, Securities Law Practice (Ill.
Inst. for CLE, 1973); Coles, An Introduction to Regulation A: Small
Business Finance Exemption, 56 CH. BAR REc. 34 (1974); 'Weiss, Regulation A Under the
Securities Act of 1933 - Highways and Byways, N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962).

181. Another shortcoming of Regulation A when compared to the SEC's recent rule
240 is that affiliate sales are included in Regulation A in computing the $500,000 ceiling.
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VI. BLUE SKY COORDINATION
As was pointed out earlier in this article, the securities laws are
structured so that an issuer must comply not only with the federal
law, if applicable, but the Blue Sky law of each state in which the
issuer proposes to offer and sell securities. One of the major problems in interstate financing, whether public or private, is coordinating compliance with the Blue Sky laws of the various states. Such
coordination is frequently difficult because Blue Sky laws vary
from state to state.
While there have been attempts at achieving uniformity of such
laws among the states,"' there are still sufficient differences between such laws that planning a private financing involving several
states can be exasperating. For example, where a financing originating in the midwest under certain midwestern state exemptions
also involves non-institutional investors in the State of California,
there is no self-executing private offering exemption for corporate
issuers of capital stock that can be invoked in the State of California. Issuers must comply with a clumsy and time consuming permit

process.18
Under rule 240 sales by affiliates are not includable in determining the limitation on the
amount of financing permitted under the rule. While a recent amendment to Regulation A
permits non-affiliates to sell, in the aggregate, $300,000 of securities beyond the $500,000
ceiling available to the issuer and its affiliates, that concession does not seem to have gone
far enough.
182. Uniform Sees. Act drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 4901.
183. California has expressly rejected a broad exemptive approach for all private offerings such as that embodied in rule 146, "Consideration of Private Placement Exemption,"
I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8708. California has a private offering exemption for offers or
sales to institutions and corporations (Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(i), I CCH BLUE SKY L.
Rep. 8133, Cal. Adm. Code § 260.102.10, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8614), as well as a
close-corporation exemption for offers or sales of voting common stock if, immediately
after the proposed sale and issuance, there will be only one class of stock outstanding which
is owned beneficially by no more than ten persons (CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102 (h)). The
state also has specialized exemptions for private offerings of any evidence of indebtedness
(CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(e), Cal. Adm. Code §§260.102.2, 260.102.3); any general partnership, joint venture or limited partnership interest, or any beneficial interests in a trust
which are "securities" and, as to such beneficial interests, are owned by no more than five
persons after sale and issuance thereof (CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(0, Cal. Adm. Code
§§ 260.102.2, 260.102.4, 260.102.5); certain participating agreements covering the purchase
of railroad rolling stock or equipment or of motor vehicles, aircraft or parts thereof (CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25102(g), Cal. Adm. Code § 260.102.2); any certificate of interest or participation in an oil or gas title or lease (CAL. CORP. CODE § 251026)). See also "Guidelines
for determining when securities are being offered to the public," California Commissioner
of Corporations Rel. No. 5-C, issued January 31, 1969, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8655.
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Moreover, the private offering exemptions available in a given
state are not, by modern-day standards, sufficiently flexible. While
rule 146 contemplates an exemption on the federal level for sales
to thirty-five persons in a twelve month period, the Blue Sky laws
are often more restrictive.
For example, under the Illinois Blue Sky laws, the sale of preincorporation subscriptions for shares of capital stock of a corporation are exempt if no commission or other remuneration is paid
for or on account of such sale and the number of such subscribers
does not exceed twenty-five.' After incorporation, securities sold
by an issuer or controlling person within any twelve consecutive
months to not more than twenty-five persons are exempt if no
commission exceeding fifteen percent of the offering price of the
securities sold is paid in connection with the sale and offers to sell
such securities are not made to more than fifty persons during the
same twelve month period. 19 This exemption requires the filing of
a report of sale within thirty days after sale and it is the filing of
this type of a report that was criticized earlier in this article in
connection with the proposed report of sale to be filed under rule
146 which the SEC finally abandoned in adopting rule 146. The
filing of this report has proven to be a trap for the unwary and, in
the opinion of this author, has been of little enforcement value.
Securities sold to corporations are also exempt because corporations are included within the "institutional" exemption in Illinois. 8
Securities issued to or exchanged with existing security holders
are exempt if no commission or other remuneration is paid in
connection with the sale or exchange of such securities. The issuance of securities to a holder of convertible securities pursuant to
the conversion privileges of such securities is also exempt, provided
no commission or other remuneration is paid in connection with
the procuring or soliciting of such conversion, and no consideration
from the holder in addition to the surrender or cancellation of the
1 7
convertible securities is required to effect the conversion. 1
Basically, the above exemptions are the principal exemptions
for so-called private financing in Illinois, and pursuant to them
184. Iil. Secs. Law of 1953, S.H.A. Ch. 121
16,204.
185. Id. at § 137.4G.
186. Id. at § 137.4C.
187. Id. at § 137.4B.

, § 137.4M, I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
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most Illinois private financing must be effectuated.
On the other hand, Wisconsin has a somewhat different set of
exemptions. Wisconsin has a pre-organization subscription exemption similar to the Illinois exemption, except there is no limitation
in Wisconsin on the number of subscribers and it is available to
non-corporate issuers. 8 Offers and sales by an issuer having its
principal office in Wisconsin are exempt if the aggregate number
of persons holding directly or indirectly the issuer's securities after
the securities to be issued are sold does not exceed fifteen, no
commission or other remuneration is paid for soliciting any such
person, and no advertising is published or circulated unless it is
permitted by the Commissioner. The same exemption contemplates that the Commissioner may waive the commission restriction and may require reports of sale under the exemption. 89 In
addition, the Wisconsin law provides for an exemption for any
transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more
than ten persons in the state during any period of twelve consecutive months whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then
present in the state if the offeror reasonably believes that all of the
persons in the state are purchasing for investment and no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly
for soliciting any person in the state. That exemption further provides that the Commissioner may by rule or order withdraw or
further condition this exemption, increase or decrease the number
of offerees permitted, waive the above conditions of the exemption
or require reports of sale under this exemption. 9 There is also an
exemption for transactions pursuant to an offer to existing security
holders of the issuer, if no commission or other remuneration
other than a standby commission is paid for soliciting any security
holder in the state of Wisconsin and if the issuer files a notice
specifying the terms of the offer and the Commissioner does not
by order disallow the exemption.19 ' The regulation issued under this
section provides that the notice of offer to existing security holders
shall include any prospectus, circular or other material to be delivered to the offerees in connection with such transaction.
188. Wisconsin Uniform Secs. Law, Wis. STAT. § 551.23(a) (1971), 3 CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP. 52,213.
189. Id. at § 551.23(10). Reasonable commissions to brokers are allowed pursuant to
Rule S.E.C. 2.02(6)(c).
190. Id. at § 551.23(1 1).
191. Id. at § 551.23(12).
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The regulations require a report of sale to be filed in connection
with the exemption dealing with the offering to not more than
fifteen people referred to above and with a offering of not more
than ten persons.9 2 A further regulation provides for an exemption
for any transaction not involving a public offering under the Act
provided that an application is filed by the issuer seeking an order
of exemption from the Commissioner.1 3 Regulations have also
been adopted exempting offers to existing security holders and to
not more than ten other persons in the state (less the number of
persons in the state with whom the issuer has effected transactions
during the preceding twelve months pursuant to the ten and fifteen
person exemptions referred to above) if no commissions are paid,
and if the issuer files an appropriate notice with the Commissioner
and the Commissioner does not disallow the exemption. 94
As is apparent, self-executing exemptions in Wisconsin for
post-incorporation financing are even more limited than in Illinois,
especially for foreign issuers with their principal places of business
outside of Wisconsin.
It is not the purpose of this article to examine, beyond the
above, the differences in the various Blue Sky laws. Suffice it to
suggest that frequently these differences are unduly restrictive of
non-institutional private financing within a given state. This restrictiveness undoubtedly has its genesis in the conservative approach to securities regulation taken by many states, but, as is the
thesis of this article generally, perhaps it is time to reexamine these
laws against the realities of the capital markets.
In view of the adoption of rule 146, the states should attempt
to coordinate with rule 146 by amending their laws to accommodate within the states a private offering structured under rule 146
(even if the transaction is to be substantially accomplished within
that state). Some sort of uniform coordination by the states for a
rule 146 transaction would greatly aid in the "Blue Skying" of
issues being sold under the rule 146 exemption. This author would
prefer that such state exemptions not require the disclosure required by rule 146, but, at the very minimum, such exemptions
192. Wis. Adm. Code § 2.02(6)(d), 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 52,602. The regulation
requires that the issuer file a report within thirty days after the aggregate amount of such
sales in Wisconsin exceeds $50,000 or sales are effected to an aggregate of twenty persons
in this state within a three-year period.
193. Wis. Adm. Code § 2.02(10)(e).
194. Wis. Adm. Code § 2.02(10)(c).
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should be expanded to coordinate with private financing, provided
it is accomplished within rule 146. Such a liberalization of the
private offering exemption within a given state would also permit
a greater use of rule 240 and rule 147.
Maryland and Delaware, for example, have recently adopted a
rule to permit coordination of rule 146 transactions. 95 Such transactions will be deemed to be in compliance with that rule upon
receipt of the issuer's representation that it has complied with rule
146. In addition, the new rule serves as a private offering exemption (apart from rule 146 transactions) in Maryland and Delaware
under criteria similar to rule 146 except the disclosure requirements of rule 146 have been omitted. This represents the type of
exemption the author is urging the states to adopt, i.e., a basic
thirty-five person per twelve month exemption without the disclosure requirements of rule 146, which exemption is deemed to have
been complied with for offerings in that state represented as
complying with rule 146. The same exemption should be available
for rule 147 and rule 240 transactions. The part of the Maryland
and Delaware rule which this author objects to is its adoption of
the "nature" of the offerees requirement of rule 146, which raises
the questions of the investigative burdens of the issuer discussed
earlier in this article, and the requirement that a report be filed for
offerings exceeding $50,000 regardless of the purpose for which the
rule is used, i.e., to coordinate rule 146 transactions or otherwise.
At the present time, whether accomplishing a private financing
under rule 147, or residual section 3(a)(1 1), rule 146 or residual
section 4(2) or rule 240, compliance must be had with the Blue Sky
laws of each state in which the offering is intended to be made.
Hopefully, this coordination will be improved in the future by the
states modifying their present private offering exemptions along
the lines suggested above to better accommodate such transactions. Such accommodation would not, in this author's opinion,
endanger the regulatory purposes of these laws.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to focus on the legal vehicles for
raising capital in the private capital markets. It is of interest that
195. Md. Rule S-7 (Rule 2.02.03.07) Transactional Exemption Under the Maryland
Securities Law 1962, 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 23,615; Del. Rule 9(b)(9)(I), 1 CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP.
11,622. See also Del. Sec. Rel. (Oct. 24, 1974), 1 CCH BLUE SKY REP.
11,653 (the explanatory release proposing the new rule).
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while we have three relatively new vehicles for old exemptions, rule
146, rule 147 and rule 240, rules 146 and 147 still contain problems
as to their suitability for private financing. While they have purportedly objectified the criteria for these two exemptions, they
have in each case burdened the elements of the exemption so as to
make the rules less useful than intended.
Intervention by the federal and state regulatory agencies is
conceded for purposes of publicly offered securities and trading in
the public securities markets. Query, whether regulation isn't being
unduly extended to the raising of capital in the private capital
markets, thereby becoming a deterrent to capital growth.

